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Abstract
This paper is designed to be a handbook for wilderness managers and advocates. 
It begins with observations about wilderness case law in general, followed by an 
overview o f how to research a potential lawsuit and what resources are available to non- 
lawyers interested in agency wilderness management. The second part o f the handbook 
contains summaries o f 14 cases, organized by subject, that pertain to wilderness areas. 
Two cases that were pertinent to wilderness were omitted because wilderness issues were 
resolved before litigation and the case issue in each was a matter o f  money to be paid to 
owners o f inholdings after wilderness designation o f the areas. All other relevant cases to 
date are included.
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Introduction
Although litigation may not be the most efficient or expert means of 
answering wilderness management questions, it is currently one of the few 
options available to the public and the government. Perhaps a more specific 
Wilderness Act (one that would give government agencies more direction in 
management) could settle disputes outside of court, but a new wilderness bill is 
not pending nor would it necessarily shrink the number of suits brought to court 
over wilderness issues. Preservationists will always demand more wilderness 
protection than developers will and individuals will always pursue private 
rights in wilderness regardless of the strictness of the statute ihat is passed. 
Therefore, it is important that people understand wilderness case law and how it 
may be useful for them to work for continued wilderness preservation. 
Observations
After reviewing these 14 wilderness cases as a citizen, I have a few 
comments to make about wilderness case law. First, while these 14 cases took 
place in wilderness, the courts do not rely solely on the Wilderness Act to make 
their decisions. In fact, the cases reference a number of statutes in addition to the 
Wilderness Act. There are few provisions in the Wilderness Act that are specific 
guidelines for management, but the overall language of the Act is vague. As a 
result, the courts rely on other statutes that apply to the different wilderness
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
areas in question. A list of statutes that have been used in wilderness case law to 
date is found in Appendix A.
Second, the courts are wary of issues that have not been finalized at an 
agency's administrative level. In fact, it seems evident that an agency must make 
a decision on an issue before a court will deliver a holding in the case. If you are 
involved with an agency decision that has not been finalized, you would be wise 
to wait to take the issue to court until a final decision is made to avoid added cost 
and wasted time.
Lastly, when the Wilderness Act is part of a case, there are two things that 
are reliable about the court's interpretation of the Act. First, if a provision 
applies to the issue that includes a waiver in the case of 'valid existing rights,' the 
court will likely decide in favor of the rights. Pay attention to whether valid 
existing rights can be established by you or the opposing side. The provisions m 
the Wilderness Act that include a 'valid existing right' clause are: Section 1133(d) 
that contains prohibitions about "commercial enterprise, permanent or 
temporary roads, mechanical transports, and structures or installations...," and 
section 1133(d)(3) that includes "[mjining and mineral leasing laws; leases, 
permits, and licenses; withdrawal of minerals from appropriation and 
disposition." There are other statutes that include 'valid existing right' 
exceptions. If pre-existing rights are a potential issue, any relevant statutes 
should be read closely for 'valid existing rights' exceptions. Second, if the 
relevant provision of the Act includes the language, "subject to such restrictions
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
as the Secretary...deems desirable" or "such reaisonable regulations governing 
...as may be prescribed by the Secretary/' the court will tend to defer to the 
agency's discretion. Again, read relevant statutes closely for this language. It 
will allow you to predict better the court's interpretation of your case.
Keep these observations in mind as you read the overview and the case 
summaries.
Note to Non-agency W ilderness Advocates
Suppose you disagreed w ith a government agency's wilderness 
management decision that affects one of your favorite spots. Have you ever 
considered what options you have to contest the decision? Unfortunately, if you 
have not acted by the time the decision has been finalized, you may not have any 
options. To attempt to influence an agency decision, the first step is to contact 
the agency staff working on the management decision. Make an appointment 
w ith the agency person in charge of the project (and any other people involved) 
to introduce yourself and establish a relationship. Ask questions about the 
proposal, express your concerns and determine what you can do to help in the 
planning process. Establish a d ia lo ^ e  about the planning decisions and why 
you agree or disagree with the management plans. Discussion could resolve the 
issues that concern you before the comment or litigation stage.
If you do expect to reach the litigation stage, it is important to consider the 
steps required to secure standing in court. A case will not be heard in court 
unless the plaintiffs have standing. The question of standing is determined by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
"whether...the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be 
redressed by a favorable decision." Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 
1508 (9* Cir. 1992) quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26.
In order to have standing in a wilderness case, you must establish that you (or a 
member of your group) have visited the area in question and that you will be 
negatively affected by the management decision. Other steps required to have 
standing include participating in the comment period.
After meeting with agency staff, participate in the public comment 
process. When a government agency announces a pending decision, it invites 
the public to comment on the proposed action. After receiving comments, the 
agency will issue its decision after consideration of public input. Forest Service 
and Bureau of Land Management decisions may be appealed in writing to the 
agency's administration.^ Before bringing a lawsuit against these agencies (USFS 
and BLM)—to have standing for a lawsuit—a plaintiff must have exhausted the 
available administrative appeal remedies. Neither the National Park Service nor 
the Fish and Wildlife Service have an appeals process. As a result, it is important 
to become involved with the situation at the comment stage for all agency 
planning. In writing comments, mention any issue about which you are 
concerned. In order to bring a challenge over a particular issue in court, you 
must have raised it in the comment period. Furthermore, include any case cites
* Each agency has a different appeal process. Contact the agency to determine 
what is required in your situation.
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that support your opinion to bolster the impact of your comments. Therefore, if 
you are interested in a wilderness area, it is prudent to stay aware of proposed 
agency actions and pending decisions at the administrative level. Contact the 
agencies to be put on their mailing or e-mail lists.
If you participated in the comment process (and, if appropriate, 
administratively appealed and were denied), it could be appropriate to consider 
a lawsuit. The purpose of this paper is to give wilderness advocates with an 
interest in wilderness management some ideas of where to start if considering 
initiating a lawsuit. There are several important considerations of wilderness 
case law that can help you decide whether you have a legitimate case and, if so, 
that can help make the process of bringing a suit easier.
Taking Action
The first step in developing a case is to write out all the facts involved. 
This should be started as soon as you learn of the facts, but at the latest, during 
the comment period before a draft environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment. Fundamentally, court decisions are based on facts. 
Three cases could be in the same wilderness area, but the decisions may all be 
different depending on the facts of the situation. Consider the two Stupak-Thrall 
cases that both contested Forest Service Forest Plan amendments m the Sylvania 
Wilderness. The cases involved the same location and the same people, but the 
court reached different conclusions in each. The court in the first case held that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the Forest Service Forest Plan amendment restricting the use of "electronic fish- 
finders, boom-boxes, and other mechanical or battery-operated devices" was 
appropriate. 843 F. Supp. at 327. In the second case, the court decided that the 
Forest Service Forest Plan amendment restricting the use of gas-powered 
motorboats in the Sylvania Wilderness infringed on the plaintiffs' valid existing 
rights.2 The court held that the plaintiffs proved that their use of motorboats was 
a valid existing right before the amendment was passed and was crucial to their 
livelihood. Facts such as bookkeeping evidence to show how that the use of 
motorboats were im portant to a plaintiffs' businesses would be valuable in 
presenting a credible case. Facts that could be important in general include the 
results of ecological studies, business receipts or expert opinions. Therefore, 
clearly research and write out the facts of your case.
Next, visit a law library to begin a review of other cases. The United 
States Code Annotated for the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C.A. 1131 et seq., lists all 
cases that refer to the Wilderness Act. Read through other cases in your court's 
jurisdiction to find ones that have similar facts. Federal courts are organized in 
circuits, typically divided geographically. A law library will have a map of 
courts and will help you decide in which jurisdiction you are. When comparing 
facts between cases, you may find that no cases are similar, but remember that 
courts pay attention to details, so a minor fact in everyday life may be useful in
 ̂The Michigan Wilderness Act states that the Wilderness Act is subject to 
'valid existing rights" of Michigan citizens.
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court. If you find a case that has similar facts, follow the reasoning of the court to 
see if it could apply to your case.
Studying other cases for similarities means that you are looking for 
precedents in case law. A precedent is a case that establishes law for that court 
and all lower courts in the circuit. If a case has been decided at the Supreme 
Court level, for example, all district and appellate courts will abide by that 
decision. Similarly, cases decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, for example, generally require that all lower courts in that circuit 
follow the law established in the case. On rare occasions, a court will overturn 
one of its own decisions if it decides the case was not correctly decided, but 
usually, a precedent is followed. If in all relevant cases the court decided against 
your contention, if it deferred to agency discretion, for example, there is slim 
chance that you will succeed in court. However, if precedents support your 
argument, then you have a stronger chance of winning. Always double-check 
that a case decision still stands and was not overturned by a later decision. It 
will save you hours of frustration.
As you read similar cases, note all the laws that were involved and 
determine the ones that apply to your situation.^ Research in the library for any 
other laws that are relevant, read them closely and note specific clauses that 
support your contention. For example, if you are concerned about an insect
 ̂Relevant statutes to date are found in Appendix A.
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control program in wilderness, note that the Wilderness Act states that the 
Secretary [of Agriculture] may take "such measures [within Wilderness Areas] ... 
as may be necessary in control of fire, insects, and diseases, subject to such 
conditions as the Secretary deems desirable." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1123(d)(1) (1982). 
Courts often rely on specific language to make their decision so attention to 
language is very important. In addition, research the statute's legislative history 
so you understand the intent of the legislators in enacting the bill. Investigate 
any relevant administrative history, which may also be important in the court's 
decision-making process.^ You will be well-prepared in the beginning stages of 
bringing your suit if you know the language of the relevant statutes, the intent of 
the legislators, and the history of tiie agency's administrative process. 
Furthermore, gathering this information may help you determine whether you 
have a solid case. That is, if there is no specific language or administrative 
history that supports your argument, odds of success are diminished.
Should you decide to proceed w ith a lawsuit, the following discussion 
illustrates the topics covered thus far, using real cases as examples.
More about Precedent
Of the fourteen wilderness case law summaries included in this paper, 
nine set precedents in the court's jurisdiction. Four precedential cases were at
 ̂Records of congressional hearings and other pertinent legislative history can be 
found in the government documents section of a library. Administrative history 
information may be requested about a particular area through the relevant government 
agency.
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the appellate level and five were at the district court level.^ Two of the four 
appellate cases concerned the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness in 
Minnesota: State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240 (8*̂  Cir. 1981), 
and Minnesota Public Interest Group v. Butz, 541 F. 2d 1292 (8* Cir. 1976). 
Lakefront water rights in the Sylvania wilderness in Michigan were at issue in 
Stupak-Thrall v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich 1994)^. Clouser v. Espy, 
42 F. 3d 1522 (9* Cir. 1994), considered access to mining claims in Kalmiopsis 
and N orth Fork John Day Wilderness Area in Oregon.
The six cases decided at the district court level included U.S. v. Gregg, 290 
F. Supp. 706 (W.D.Wash. 1968), which established that airplanes were illegal 
within wilderness unless a special exception was made by the Secretary. One 
case, Stupak-Thrall II, 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997), held that banning gas- 
powered motorboats in the Sylvania Wilderness constituted a taking of the 
plaintiff's valid existing right to operate motorboats for business. Sierra Club v. 
Lyng, 663 F. Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1987), considered a Southern Pine Beetle program 
in a wilderness area and decided that it was an appropriate program within
 ̂A case is first heard at the district level. If the district court’s decision is 
appealed by one of the parties, the case is heard at the appellate level.
® The case was heard en banc before the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit. The court was equally divided so that the earlier appellate decision by a 
panel of three judges was vacated and the district court mling automatically was affirmed 
because there were not sufficient votes to reverse it. Anyone relying on the district court 
case, however, should be aware that one-half of the appellate court disagreed with the 
decision, leaving some question as to how other courts considering the issue would 
resolve it.
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wilderness management guidelines. McGrail & Rowley v. Babbitt, 986 F. Supp, 
1386 (S.D. Fla. 1997), explained how the Property Clause of the Constitution 
gives Congress, and through delegation, federal agencies, the right to regulate 
non-federal waters and lands. The court in Audubon v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825 
(D. Alaska 1984), reversed a land transfer of wilderness in Alaska that Secretary 
Hodel defended under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act 
(ANILCA). 16U .S.C .§3101etseq.
The following federal statutes address the management of wilderness 
areas. The Wilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq.; the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq.; and the Alaska National 
Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq. In addition, the 
Property Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S.C.A. Constitution (Article 
4, § 3, clause 2) has been used several times by the courts in their decisions about 
public land management. The Property Clause reads: "The Congress shall have 
the Power to dispose of and make all Rules and Regulations respecting the 
territory or other Property belonging to the United States..." United States 
Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2. Studying the incorporation of the Property 
Clause in several decisions illustrates how a precedent is useful for later cases. 
Three cases. State of Minnesota v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240; Stupak-Thrall v. U.S., 843 F. 
Supp. 827; and McGrail & Rowley v. Babbitt, 986 F. Supp. 1386, provide an 
example of how a case uses precedent, how it has been useful in wilderness case 
law, and how it is a tool for later courts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F, 2d 1240, one of the issues 
before the court was whether Congress (and through delegation, the Forest 
Service) could regulate motorized use in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. The 
court held that Congress had the authority to regulate non-federal lands and 
waters according to the Property Clause of the Constitution as long as the 
regulations were for the overall good of the public lands. The court referred to 
precedents, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, and United States v. Brown, 431 
U.S. 949, and Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, in which the Supreme Court 
ruled that the Property Clause could include private or state land.
In Stupak-Thrall, a similar case questioned the regulation of "electronic 
fish-fmders, boom-boxes, and other mechanical or battery-operated devices."
843 F. Supp. at 327. The court referred to several precedents: Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, United States v. Brown, 431 U.S. 949, Camfield v. United States, 
167 U.S. 518, and State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240, in its 
conclusion that the Property Clause allowed regulation of non-federal lands as 
long as the regulations were reasonable. In Stupak-Thrall, the regulations were to 
keep the area in compliance with its new wilderness designation.
The court in McGrail & Rowley v. Babbitt, 986 F. Supp. 1386, referred to the 
Property Clause in its decision to explain why the Fish and Wildlife Service 
could regulate commercial use of federal lands including submerged lands and 
adjacent state waters. The decision refers the reader to and includes language 
from State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block: "'Congress clearly has the power to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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dedicate federal lands for particular purposes. As a necessary incident of that 
power. Congress must have the ability to insure that these lands be protected 
against interference with their intended purposes."' 986 F. Supp. at 1386 quoting 
660 F. 2d 1240.
It is evident in these three examples that precedent is an important tool for 
courts and that over time precedential law may create trends in wilderness 
management. That is, as the Property Clause applies to a range of wilderness 
management issues, wilderness managers will need to keep it in mind as they 
regulate non-federal lands, where necessary, in an environmentally-sound 
manner while considering private rights before acting.
Interpretation of Laws
In addition to using precedents, courts pay close attention to specific 
language in the statute applicable to a case. In Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F. Supp. 
556, and Clouser v. Espy, 42 F. 3d 1522, the courts made their decisions according 
to language in specific clauses in the Wilderness Act. In Sierra v. Lyng, which 
concerned a federal beetle-control program in wilderness, the court noted that 
the Wilderness Act "authorizes the Secretary to carry out 'such measures [within 
Wilderness Areas] ... as may be necessary in control of fire, insects, and diseases, 
subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems desirable,"' 663 F. Supp. at 558 
quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1123(d)(l)(1982). The court reasoned that the Wilderness Act 
gave the Secretary the authority to carry out a beetle control program in 
wilderness. The court then determined that the Secretary's decision was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reasonable and that his actions would not sacrifice wilderness quality for the
interests of nearby private land owners.
In Clouser v. Espy, 42 F. 3d at 1534, the court was to decide if the Forest
Service had the right to determine the means of access to mining claims within
wilderness. The court quoted the Wilderness Act:
In any case where valid mining claims or other valid occupancies 
are wholly within a designated national forest wilderness area, the 
Secretary of Agriculture shall by reasonable regulations consistent 
w ith the preservation of the area as wilderness, permit ingress and 
egress to such surrounded areas by means which have been or are 
being customarily enjoyed w ith respect to other such areas 
similarly situated. 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b).
The Wilderness Act provided the important language that provided the basis for
the court's decision.^
In other cases, the language of the statute must be supplemented by other
information, such as a history of the statute, legislative intent, or other facts
relevant to the situation. In Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.
2d at 1297, the court studied the Wilderness Act, which contains a special
provision allowing timber production in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. The
special provision states:
Other provisions of this chapter to the contrary notwithstanding, 
the management of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area ... shall be in 
accordance with regulations established by the Secretary of 
Agriculture in accordance with the general purpose of maintaining.
 ̂When an agency acts, it acts under the delegation of authority by Congress or 
the relevant Secretary, as provided by statute. The Forest Service has the authority to 
regulate the National Forest System according to regulations and statutes through the 
Organic Administrative Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 478,551.
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without unnecessary restrictions on other uses, including that of 
timber, the primitive character of the area, particularly in the 
vicinity of lakes, streams and portages.... 16 U.S.C. §1133(d)(5).
Timber was included by legislators as an "other use" leading the court to decide
that logging was permitted in certain situations. To help clarify the issue, the
court considered the administrative history of designation of the Boundary
Waters Canoe Area as a wilderness. Specifically, the court noted that the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area was a unique wilderness that had never been
managed as a "pure wilderness." In its decision, the court incorporated this
information from the legislative intent and administrative history into its
decision that timber production was allowed in the Boundary Waters Canoe
Area's Portal Zone. 541 F. 2d at 1307.
Another example is National Audubon v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825, in which
the plaintiffs challenged a land exchange authorized by Secretary of Interior
Hodel. The court looked to the applicable statutes. Section 1302(h) of Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act provides that a land exchange must be
in the 'public interest.' In reviewing the Secretary's reasoning for authorizing
the transfer of a wilderness island for lands within a refuge, the court looked to
relevant facts as they related to the statutory language. The language of the
statute served as a guide in the court's research. The court studied the potential
impact of the exchange on St. Matthew Island. Information about the natural
environment on St. Matthew Island and the proposed development on the island
led the court to determine that the land exchange would be detrimental to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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unique wilderness environment on the island. Therefore, the court held that the 
exchange would not improve national conservation objectives and was in poor 
judgment. Id at 846.
Judicial Involvem ent versus Agency Discretion
Often a case is not decided even after consulting statutes and 
incorporating an interpretation of the meaning or intent of the statute. In those 
cases, the court may defer to the government agency involved. Agency 
discretion is an important aspect of wilderness case law (and management) as 
the courts reason that the agency made a particular management decision based 
on expert opinions in the relevant field. The idea is that the courts know the law 
while the agency experts know the science. In Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F. Supp. at 
560, the court ultimately trusted the Secretary's, and therefore the Forest 
Service's, determination that the beetle program was reasonable. In the same 
case the court decided that a beetle program  could be conducted within a 
wilderness (see above). But once the court held that a beetle control program 
could be carried out in a wilderness, it deferred to the agency's discretion on the 
legitimacy of the particular program.
In Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F. 2d 1405 (10^ Cir. 1990), federal reserved 
water rights were at issue. Plaintiffs contended that federal reserved water rights 
existed in Colorado wilderness. The court held that the Wilderness Act did not 
m andate how agencies should memage potential federal reserved water rights.
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and that management of such rights should be left to the discretion of the 
particular agency and was not an issue for the courts to decide.
Conversely, cases in which the court disagrees with a government 
agency's decision are rare. In wilderness case law there are two examples. The 
court in Audubon v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. at 846, found that Secretary Hodel had 
used poor judgment in authorizing the St. Matthew Island land exchange. 
Although the court held that the Secretary's decision was not arbitrary and 
capricious, it cancelled the land transfer and criticized the Secretary's decision as 
an abuse of discretion. In Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman, 988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D.Mich. 
1997), the court decided against the Forest Service in holding that the plaintiffs' 
use of motorboats was a valid existing right. The Forest Service had issued a 
regulation banning the use of motorboats in the Sylvania Wilderness. The 
plaintiffs successfully challenged the Forest Service's decision when the court 
held that the Forest Service Amendment infringed on their use of motorboats for 
their livelihoods under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution.
Last Words
Finally, a lawsuit requires time, energy and money. Seriously consider 
the options available to you before instigating the legal process. Once you have 
assembled your facts, consult an attorney for advice on whether to and how to 
proceed. Consult like-minded environmental groups (with or without legal 
staffs) in your community for guidance. Many groups have been involved in 
litigation over public land issues and may have suggestions to make the process
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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easier.8 If you have a promising case, other groups and individuals may want to 
join you as plaintiffs. Overall, remember to be involved at the decision-making 
process through public comment and appeals so that litigation may not be 
necessary and, if it is, you or your group is legally entitled to bring a suit.
The next section of this paper includes case summaries of lawsuits that 
have pertained to wilderness areas. Part One includes cases that set precedents 
in their jurisdictions and the cases are organized by subject. As you read the 
cases, consider any corollaries to the issue that concerns you—the case 
summaries may be useful to you regardless of the fact that the subject of the case 
may be unrelated to your issue. Part Two contains cases that are of interest, but 
do not offer precedents in their jurisdictions. The district court decision may 
have been overturned by the appellate court, and the case issue remanded to the 
agency for a final decision. Or, an issue may have been resolved before the 
appellate court heard the case, rendering the court's decision irrelevant. These 
cases are divided by subject as well. The appendix lists useful statutes. Code of 
Federal Regulation references, agency manual references and websites.
* An environmental group with litigation experience may be able to refer 
you to a lawyer willing to help you on a pro bono basis.
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M innesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz 
541F. 2d 1292 (8* Cir. 1976)
Case History
401 F. Supp. 1276 (1975)— reversed by 541 F. 2d 1292 (1976)— stay denied by 
429 U.S. 935,97 S. Ct. 347— AND  cert, denied by 430 U.S. 922,97 S. Ct. 1340. 
Background
The defendants appealed the district court's decision to grant a permanent 
injunction against present and future logging in areas of and next to virgin forest 
in the Portal Zone of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA).
The Boundary Water Canoe Area contains two sections within its borders: 
the Portal and Interior Zone. The Portal Zone contains approximately 412,000 
acres in which timber production has been permitted. The Interior Zone contains 
approximately 618,000 acres, in which logging has been prohibited.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Minnesota Public Interest Group and Sierra Club, appellees.
The plaintiffs argued that logging was prohibited in virgin forest areas in 
the Boundary Waters Canoe Area according to the national Wilderness Act of 
1964 (Wilderness Act). 16 U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq. In addition, they argued that 
the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was inadequate under the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332.
18
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D efendants' Identities and Contentions
Earl V. Butz, Individually and as Secretary of Agriculture, et a l, 
appellants.
The defendants contended that logging was permitted in the Wilderness 
Act under the special provision regarding the BWCA. They also claimed that the 
EIS was adequate under NEPA.
Case Issues
(1) Did the Wilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq., prohibit 
logging in the virgin forest areas of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area?
(2) Did the Forest Service's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) meet 
the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)? 42 U.S.C.A. 
§4332.
Court's Holdings
On whether the Wilderness Act prohibited logging: The court of appeals 
held that logging was permitted in certain parts of the Portal Zone, according to 
provisions of the Wilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq. The court 
determined that the Wilderness Act's ban on commercial logging in Boundary 
Water Canoe Area sections contiguous to virgin forest was dependent on certain 
exceptions, "'subject to existing private rights,' and other exceptions in the Act." 
16 U .S.C § 1133(c).
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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The BWCA is included in a specific exception within the 
Wilderness Act. Other provisions of this chapter to the contrary 
notwithstanding, the management of the Boundary Waters Canoe 
Area, formerly designated as the Superior, Little Indian Sioux, and 
Caribou Roadless Areas, in the Superior National Forest,
Minnesota}, shall be in accordance with regulations established by 
the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with the general purpose 
of maintaining, without unnecessary restrictions on other uses, 
including that of timber, the primitive character of the area, 
particularly in the vicinity of lakes, streams, and portages: Provided,
That nothing in this chapter shall preclude the continuance within 
the area of any established use of motorboats." 16 U.S.C. §
1133(d)(5).
The court of appeals determined three points from their reading of the 
statute. First, the BWCA was subject to special treatment regarding logging in 
the wilderness. Second, management of the BWCA was delegated by Congress 
to the Secretary of Agriculture. Third, management of the BWCA should protect 
the primitive quality of the area without undue restrictions on timber and other 
uses. Furthermore, the court found that the administrative and legislative 
history of the BWCA proved that logging was present at the time of designation 
of the BWCA and was approved within the Portal Zone, even in virgin areas 
away from shoreline areas. 541 F. 2d at 1297.
As a final point on the special provision issue, the court explained that the 
BWCA "has never been managed as a pure wilderness area. The Wilderness Act 
did not change this management policy. The Act preserved the traditional 
BWCA management policy of multiple use." 541 F. 2d at 1298. Therefore,
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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referring to both legislative and statutory interpretation, the court found that the 
district court erred in its finding and stated that timber was a legitimate use in 
the BWCA's Portal Zone.
On whether or not the EIS was adequate: The court outlined three 
purposes of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The court must be able to 
review the environmental record presented and be able to conclude that the 
agency made a "good faith effort" to meet the goals of NEPA. Second, the EIS 
must present a full record of environmental effects of the specific project for 
public information. Finally, the EIS must present "reasoned analysis" regarding 
conflicting data or opinions.
The court concluded that the EIS had been completed in "good faith 
objectivity." Satisfactory information had been included in the EIS for the court 
to determine that while not exhaustive, the document provided ample 
information for its public audience (iticluding Congress and federal agencies).
In response to specific reasoning by the district court, the court of appeals 
explained its position. The district court determined that the matrices approach 
in the EIS was inadequate to consider the various environmental effects of the 
alternatives. The court of appeals disagreed stating that the matrices provided 
the most information in the most readable way—writing out the environmental 
effects would have taken too much time to be reasonable. The district court also 
stated that the EIS did not discuss the negative environmental impacts of virgin
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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timber logging. The court of appeals found that a fair amount of the EIS 
discussed logging in virgin timber areas and the related effects. In the case that 
virgin timber would be cut, the EIS stated that individual environmental 
analyses would be completed for each area. The court also stated that 354,000 
acres of the 501,000 acres of remaining virgin timber are in the protected Interior 
Zone of the BWCA.
The discussion of future timber sales troubled the court of appeals. The 
court found that the plan for future logging was inadequate. The court 
determined that the EIS was complete concerning present sales. Environmental 
analysis reports (EARs) were completed for each pending sale. The EIS stated 
that EARs would be done for any timber sale in the BWCA in the future as well. 
The court of appeals decided that the Forest Service acted according to NEPA for 
pending sales w ith the inclusion of individual sale EARs. However, it continued 
a permanent injunction for future sales until the Forest Service issued a more 
complete report in its Superior National Forest Timber Management Plan and 
accompanying EIS.
Result
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision on the basis that 
the Wilderness Act of 1964 allowed logging in virgin forest areas of the BWCA 
and that the environmental impact statement (EIS) completed for the BWCA was 
adequate. The court of appeals did decide that the EIS was inadequate
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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concerning future logging plans. The court maintained the permanent injunction 
concerning future logging until the new  Timber Management Plan and EIS were 
completed.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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O ther Cases Referenced
Tudicial review under NEPA—Environmental Defense Fund (EOF) v. Corps 
of Engineers (Corps), 470 F. 2d 289,294 (8*  Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 412 U.S. 931,93
S. Ct. 2749,37 L.Ed.2d 160 (1973).
"Detailed statements" requirements—EOF v. Froehlke, 473 F. 2d 346,351 
(8 *̂  Cir. 1972); EDF v. Corps, supra, 470 F. 2d at 295; Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F. 2d 
813,820 (5* Cir. 1975); Silva v. Lynn, 482 F. 2d 1282  ̂1284 (l^t Cir. 1973); Calvert 
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 
33,449 F. 2d 1109,1114 (1971).
Good faith obiectivitv—EDF v. Corps, supra, 470 F. 2d at 296; Iowa Citizens 
for Environmental Quality, Inc. (ICEQ) v. Volpe, 487 F. 2d 849,852 (8‘h Cir. 1973); 
EDF V. Callaway, 497 F. 2d 1340 (8 ‘̂  Cir. 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc. (NRDC) V. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5,458 F. 2d 827,836 (1972); Cape Henry 
Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404,412 (W.D.Va.), affd per curiam, 484 F. 2d 453 
(4* Cir. 1973).
Substantive review—EDF v. Corps, 470 F. 2d at 298; EDF v. Froelhke, supra, 
473 F. 2d at 358; Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission, supra, 449 F. 2d at 1115; Citizens to Freserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402,416,91 S. Ct. 814,28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971); Kleppe v. Sierra Club, —U.S. —, 
—, n.21,96 S. Ct. 2718,2731,49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976).
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Procedural compliance under NEPA—Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, supra, 
359 F. Supp. at 415; EDF v. Froehlke, supra, 368 F. Supp. at 240; Kleppe v. Sierra 
Club, supra, —U.S. at —, 96 S. Ct. 2718.
EIS alternatives—ICEQ v. Volpe, supra, 487 F. 2d at 852; NRDC v. Morton, 
supra, 458 F. 2d 834; EDF v. Froehlke, supra, 368 F. Supp. at 240.
Future sales: Kleppe v. Sierra Club, supra, —U.S. at — 96 S. Ct. 2718; Sierra 
Club V. Froehlke, supra, 534 F. 2d at 1297.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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State o f Minnesota by Alexander v. Block 
660 F. 2d 1240 {S^ Cir. 1981)
Case History
National Association of Property Owners v. U.S., 499 F. Supp. 1223 (D. Minn. 
1980)—judgment affirmed by State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240 
(8*  Cir. 1981)—cert, denied by Minnesota v. Block, 455 U.S. 1007 (U.S. Minn. 1982) 
Background
Three suits brought by the National Association of Property Owners 
against the United States were combined in this opinion: (1) National Association 
of Property Owners v. U.S., Civil 5-79-95 (D.Minn.l979), (2) Minnesota v. Bergland, 
Civ. 5-79-178/ (3) National Association of Property Owners v. U.S., Civ. 5-80-25.
The Boundary Waters Canoe Area was incorporated as wilderness in the 
1964 National Wilderness Preservation System Act (Wilderness Act) with the 
provision that "nothing in this chapter shall preclude the continuance within the 
area of any already established use of motorboats." 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5) (1976).
The plaintiffs challenged the legality of the 1978 Boundary Waters Canoe 
Area Wilderness Act (Act). Congress passed the 1978 Act to protect the area's 
wilderness environment from potential degradation. Included in the new Act 
were restrictions on motorized use in the BWCAW. Section 4 restricted 
motorboat use (maximum of 10-25 horsepower) except in certain designated 
areas and snowmobile use was restricted to two trails.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Case No. 1: National Association of Property Owners; National Park 
Inholders Association; Ely-Winton Boundary Waters Conservation Alliance;
Local 4757 United States Steel Workers of America; Lac La Croix Indian Band; 
Greater Virginia Area Chamber of Commerce; Crane Lake Commercial Club; 
Minnesota Arrowhead Association; Ely Chamber of Commerce; Carol M. Fisher; 
Border Lakes Association; Crane Lake Voyageur Snowmobile Club, Inc.; Crane 
Lake Sportsmen's Club; Ash River Namakan Lake Association; Charlotte Ekroot, 
d /b / a  Windigo Lodge; Robert J. Handberg, d /b /a  Campbell's Cabins and 
Trading Post. National Association of Property Owners is based in San Antonio, 
Texas. National Parks Inholders Association is based in Tahoe, California. Both 
organizations brought this suit as representatives of its members. All other 
plaintiffs use the BWCAW or operate businesses on the border of the BWCAW. 
State of Minnesota, plaintiff-intervenor.
The plaintiffs in the first case argued that (1) Congress unlawfully 
delegated power to the Secretary to designate the boundaries of the Boundary 
Water Canoe Area Wilderness; and (2) section 4 of the Act, restricting the use of 
snowmobiles and motorboats, discriminated against disabled persons, violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and violated Ninth 
Amendment rights as the disabled need motorized access in order to enjoy the 
BWCAW. 499 F. Supp. at 1236.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Case No. 2: State of Minnesota by Joseph N. Alexander, its Commissioner 
of Natural Resources.
Carl Brown, d /b / a  Walleye Bait & Tackle Co.; Viking Cruises, Inc.; 
Concerned Citizens of Northeastern Minnesota; Boundary Waters Landowners 
Association, a Minnesota non-profit corporation; Koochiching County; City of 
South International Falls; Village of Ranier; International Falls Chamber of 
Commerce; Minnesota United Snowmobilers Association, Inc.; City of 
International Falls, plaintiff-intervenors.
The plaintiffs in the second case argued that the BWCAW Act was 
unlawful because the federal government lacked the constitutional authority to 
regulate non-federal lands and waters.
Case No. 3: National Association of Property Owners; Ely-Winton 
Boundary Waters Conservation Alliance; Range Actioneers, Inc.; Crane Lake 
Sportsmen's Club; City of Winton.
In the third case, the plaintiffs argued that the enactment of the BWCAW 
Act constituted a significant major federal action so that an environmental 
impact statement was required per the National Environmental Policy Act of 
1976. 42 U.S.C. §4332(2)(C).
D efendants' Identities and Contentions
Case No. 1: United States of America; Bob Bergland, Secretary of 
Agriculture, individually and in his official capacity.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Sierra Club; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; League of 
Women Voters of Minnesota; Izaak Walton League of America, Inc.; Minnesota 
Rovers; Wilderness Inquiry II; Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens 
Association; Minneapolis Chapter, National Audubon Society; St. Paul Chapter, 
National Audubon Society; Duluth Chapter, National Audubon Society; 
Minnesota Ornithologists' Union; The Wilderness Society, defendants- 
intervenors.
Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' suits 
and declaring the BWCAW Act lawful.
Case No. 2: Robert Bergland, individually and as Secretary of Agriculture 
of the United States.
Sierra Club; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; Izaak Walton 
League of America, Inc.; The League of Women Voters of Minnesota, Inc.; 
Minnesota Rovers; Wilderness Inquiry II; Minnesota Environmental Control 
Citizens Association; Minneapolis Chapter, National Audubon Society; St. Paul 
Chapter, National Audubon Society; Duluth Chapter, National Audubon Society; 
Minnesota Ornithologists' Union; The Wilderness Society; defendant- 
intervenors.
Defendants move for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' suits 
and declaring the BWCAW Act lawful.
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Case No. 3: Bob Bergland, Individually and in his official capacity as 
Secretary of Agriculture; R. Max Peterson, individually and in his official 
capacity as Chief of the United States Forest Service.
Sierra Club; Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness; League of 
Women Voters of Minnesota; Izaak Walton League of America, Inc.; Minnesota 
Rovers; Wilderness Inquiry II; Minnesota Environmental Control Citizens 
Association; Minneapolis Chapter, National Audubon Society; St. Paul Chapter, 
National Audubon Society; Duluth Chapter, National Audubon Society; 
Minnesota Ornithologists' Union; The Wilderness Society; defendants- 
intervenors.
Defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' suits 
and declaring the BWCAW Act lawful.
Case No. 1 Issues
(1) Did Congress unlawfully delegate authority to the Secretary of 
Agriculture to draw  the boundaries of the new Wilderness Area?
(2) Does the Act, by limiting motorboat and snowmobile use in the 
Wilderness, discriminate, unconstitutionally, against the class of all handicapped 
persons and the class of all persons less physically fit?
Case No. 2 Issue
(1) Was Congress authorized to regulate non-federal lands and waters?
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Case No. 3 Issue
(1) Did the execution of the 1978 Boundary Waters Canoe Area 
Wilderness Act constitute a significant major federal action requiring an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy 
Act?
Court's Holdings Case No. 1
On the designation of the boundaries of the BWCAW: The court held that 
Congress did not delegate illegal authority to the Secretary. Rather, Congress 
designated the boundaries of the BWCAW, not the Secretary. Congress did 
require the Secretary to publish a description and map of the boundaries in the 
Federal Register.
On the question of the Act's discrimination towards disabled persons:
The court held that the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act did not 
discriminate against disabled persons in restricting snowmobile and motorboat 
use in the wilderness.
The Ninth Amendment claim by the plaintiffs was unfounded as the 
Ninth Amendment only protects "fundamental rights." "Fundamental rights" 
have been construed strictly by the courts and include the right to interstate 
travel, the right to procreate, the right to choose a safe method of contraception, 
the right to marry, and the right to child-rearing and education. The present
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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issue of motorized access to the wilderness did not constitute a fundamental 
right in the view of the court.
Furthermore, the court held that the Act was not subject to review on the 
issue of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment which requires judicial 
review only if the plaintiffs "fundamental rights" were abused. As stated above, 
the issue of motorized access by the disabled did not qualify as a "fundamental 
right."
C ourf s Holdings Case No. 2
On the authority of Congress to regulate non-federal lands and waters:
The court held that Congress was authorized by the Constitution's Property 
Clause to regulate non-federal lands and waters. The Property Clause states that: 
"The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the
United States " U.S. Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2. To maintain the
wilderness quality of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, Congress 
chose to regulate motorized use m the area. Therefore, the motorized regulation 
was in keeping with the Property Clause for certain for federal land.
The court referred to precedents in which the Supreme Court held that the 
Property Clause could be extended to state- or privately-owned lands. See Kleppe 
V. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,536,96 S. Ct. 2285,2290,49 L.Ed. 2d 34 (1976). In 
Kleppe, the court found that Congress could regulate non-federal lands if the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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regulations were necessary to protect public lands. The decision was expanded 
in United States v. Brown, 552 F. 2d 817 (8*  Cir. 1977), to include non-federally 
owned waters as long as the regulations were to protect the public lands or 
waters.
The court held that as long as the Congress's regulations were reasonable, 
it could, according to the Constitution, regulate non-federal lands and waters. 
Since the purpose of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness is to protect 
the wilderness quality of the area, the court found that regulations on motorized 
access were reasonable.
Court's Holdings Case No. 3
On whether the 1978 Act constituted a significant major federal action:
The court held that the National Environmental Policy Act did not apply to the 
enactment of the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness Act of 1978.
Therefore, the action was not a significant major federal action and an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) was not required.
First, the court noted that the main purpose of an EIS is to help the federal 
agency involved to make an appropriate decision on an agency project. In the 
BWCAW Act case, the Congress wrote and passed the Act congressionally—it 
was not an agency decision. Therefore, while the Secretary must enforce the 
congressional Act, he had no ability to change it. As a result, preparation of an 
EIS was not applicable.
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Furthermore, the Flint Ridge Doctrine (Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic 
Rivers Ass'n, 426 U.S. 776,96 S. Ct. 2430,49 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1976)), explained that 
EIS requirements and NEPA are superceded by other specific statute mandates. 
For example, the BWCAW Act states that it was to be implemented by January 1, 
1979. For the court to order an EIS would delay the implementation date and 
thereby conflict w ith the statutory mandate of the BWCAW Act.
Result
In all three cases, the defendants' and defendant-intervenors' motions for 
summary judgment were granted. The plaintiffs' motions for summary 
judgment was denied. The BWCAW Act was declared lawful.
Case No. 1, O ther Cases Referenced
Review of congressional act—Chacon v. Granata, 515 F. 2d 922,925 (5‘*' Cir. 
1975), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 930,96 S. Ct. 279,46 L.Ed. 2d 258 (1975).
Congressional authority to designate wilderness boundaries—Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935); Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,55 S. Ct. 837,79 L.Ed. 1570 (1935);
Yakus V. United States, 321 U.S. 414,64 S. Ct. 660,88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); Amalgamated 
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C.1971); Kent 
V. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,78 S. Ct. 1113,2 L.Ed. 2d 1204 (1958); Shuttlesworth v. 
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,151,89 S. Ct. 935,938,22 L.Ed. 2d 162 (1969); Hander v. 
San Jacinto Junior College, 325 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.Tex.l971).
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Congressional constitutional authority to regulate wilderness—Izaak 
Walton League v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698,710 (D.Minn.l973), rev'd on other 
grounds, 497 F. 2d 849 (8* Cir. 1974); Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593,597- 
98 (D.Colo.1970), a fd  448 F. 2d 793,795-96 (lÔ h Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 
989,92 S. Ct. 1252,31 L.Ed. 2d 455 (1972); McMichael v. United States, 355 F. 2d 
283,286 (9*h Cir. 1965); Gregg v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 706,707-08 
(W.D.Wash. 1968).
Question of discrimination under BWCAW Act of 1978—Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,11,87 S. Ct. 1817,1823,18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 (1967); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214,216,65 S. Ct. 193,194,98 L.Ed. 194 (1944); Graham v. 
Riclmrdson, 403 U.S. 365,371-72,91 S. Ct. 1848,1851-52,29 L.Ed. 2d 534 (1971).
"Suspect classes"—Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,363-64,92 S. Ct. 995, 
1013-14,31 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1972); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1,28,93 S. Ct. 1278,1294,36 L.Ed. 2d 16 (1973); Johnson v. Robison, 415 
US. 361,375 n. 14,94 S. Ct. 1160,1169 n. 14,39 L.Ed. 2d 389 (1974); Massachusetts 
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,313,96 S. Ct. 2562,2566,49 L.Ed. 2d 520 
(1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,686,93 S. Ct. 1764,1770,36 L.Ed. 2d 
583 (1973); Carmi v. Metropolitan St, Louis Sewer District, 620 F. 2d 672 at 676 n. 9 
(8*  Cir. 1980); Counts v. United States Postal Service, 17 FEF Cases 1161,1164 
(N.D.Fla. 1978); Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656,663 n. 14 (N.D.Ohio 1977); Doe 
V. Colautti, 592 F. 2d 740,710-11 (3d Cir. 1979).
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"Fimdamental" rights—Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,371,91 S. Ct. 
1848,1851,29 L.Ed. 2d 534 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425-26,81 
S. Ct. 1101,1104-05,6 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1961); State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs v. Jackson, 283 
U.S. 527,537,51 S. Ct. 540,543, 75 L.Ed. 1248 (1931); Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis 
Co., 240 U.S. 342,357,36 S. Ct. 370,374,60 L.Ed. 679 (1916); Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78-79,31 S. Ct. 337,340-41,55 L.Ed. 369 (1911); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,638,89 S. Ct. 1322,1333,22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1969); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541,62 S. Ct. 1110,1113,86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453-54,92 S. Ct. 1029,1038-39,31 L.Ed. 2d 349 
(1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,12,87 S. Ct. 1817,1823,18 L.Ed. 2d 1010 
(1967); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,535,45 S. Ct. 571,573,69 L.Ed. 1070 
(1925); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,29-34,93 S. Ct. 1278,1294- 
1297,36 L.Ed. 2d 16 (1973).
Ninth Amendment—Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484,85 S. Ct. 
1678,1681,14 L.Ed. 2d 510 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705,35 L.Ed. 
2d 147 (1973); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325,58 S. Ct. 149,152,82 L.Ed.
288 (1937).
Fifth Amendment—Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,328,58 S. Ct. 149,
158,82 L.Ed. 288 (1937); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,43 S. Ct. 625,67 L.Ed.
1042 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,45 S. Ct. 571,69 L.Ed. 1070 
(1925); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,84 S. Ct. 1659,12 L.Ed. 2d 992
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(1964); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,85 S. Ct. 1678,14 L.Ed. 2d 510 (1965); 
Roe V. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,93 S. Ct. 705,35 L.Ed. 2d 147 (1973).
Reasonable restrictions bv Congress—McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 
425-26,81 S. Ct. 1101,1104-05,6 L.Ed. 2d 393 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 
348 U.S. 483,489,75 S. Ct. 461,465,99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural 
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,78-79,31 S. Ct. 337,340-41,55 L.Ed. 369 (1911).
Takings—fCo/z/ v. United States, 91 U.S. (1 Otto) 367,372,23 L.Ed. 449 
(1875); Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55,78-80,57 S. Ct. 364, 
375-76,81 L.Ed. 510 (1937); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413,43 S. 
Ct. 158,159,67 L.Ed. 322 (1922); Cf. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U.S.
546,551,66 S. Ct. 715,717,90 L.Ed. 843 (1946); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26,32- 
36,75 S. Ct. 98,102-104,99 L.Ed. 27 (1954).
Treaty questions—The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581,600,9 S. Ct.
623,627,32 L.Ed. 1068 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,195,8 S. Ct. 456, 
458,31 L.Ed. 386 (1888); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580,599,5 S. Ct. 247,254, 28 
L.Ed. 798 (1884); United States v. Postal, 589 F. 2d 862,878-79 n. 25 (5* Cir. 1979); 
Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41,45 & n. 9,71 S. Ct. 553,555 & n. 9,95 L.Ed. 729 
(1951); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503,508,67 S. Ct. 1431,1434,91 L.Ed. 1633 (1947); 
Diggs V. Shultz, 470 F. 2d 461,465-66 & n . 4  (D.C.Cir. 1972).
Standing—Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,731,92 S. Ct. 1361,1364,31 
L.Ed. 2d 636 (1972); Wampler v. Goldschmidt, 486 F. Supp. 1130,1133
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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(D.Minn.l980); Association of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150,152-53,90 S. Ct. 827,829,25 L.Ed. 2d 184 (1970); Rodeway Inns of America, Inc. 
V. Frank, 541 F. 2d 759,763-65 (8*̂  Cir. 1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 
93 S. Ct. 1146,35 L.Ed. 2d 536 (1973); Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134,1148-49 
(M.D.N.C.1977); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456,82 S. Ct. 501,505,7 L.Ed. 2d 446 
(1962); United States v. Peskin, 527 F. 2d 71,86 (7^̂  c ir. 1975); United States v. Oaks, 
527 F. 2d 937,940 (9*h Cir. 1976); United States v. Berrios, 501 F. 2d 1207,1211 (2d 
Cir. 1974).
Case No. 2, O ther Cases Referenced
Property clause—Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,525-26,17 S. Ct. 
864,865-67,42 L.Ed. 260 (1987); CfHunt v. United States, 278 U S. 96,100,49 S. Ct. 
38, 73 L.Ed. 200 (1928); United States v. Brown, 552 F. 2d 817 (8* Cir. 1977).
Case No. 3, O ther Cases Referenced
Major federal action—South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F. 2d 1190 (8^̂  Cir. 1980); 
N.A.A.C.P. V. Medical Center Inc., 584 F. 2d 619,634 (3d Cir. 1978); Monroe County 
Conserv. Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F. 2d 693,697 (2d Cir. 1972); Environmental 
Defense Fund Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F. 2d 289,294 (8* Cir. 1972), cert, 
denied, 412 U.S. 931,93 S. Ct. 2749,37 L.Ed. 2d 160 (1973); Calvert Cliffs' 
Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. A.E.C., 449 F. 2d 1109,1114 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Pacific 
Legal Foundation v. Quarles, 440 F. Supp. 316,326 (C.D.Cal.l977); Lake Berryessa 
Tenants' Council v. United States, 588 F. 2d 267 (9* Cir. 1978).
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Flint Ridge Doctrine—Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n,
426 U.S. 776,96 S. Ct. 2430,49 L.Ed. 2d 205 (1976); Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 
1155,1161 (D.AIaska 1978); Accord Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 502 F. 2d 1154,1156-57 
(Temp.Emer.Ct.App.l974); Dry Color Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 
486 F. 2d 98,107-08 (3d Cir. 1973); Atlanta Gas. Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 
476 F. 2d 142,150 (5‘h Cir. 1973).
Boundary Waters Canoe Area
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Clouser v. Espy 
42 F. 3d 1522 (9*h Cir. 1994)
Case History
Clouser v. Madigan, 1992 WL 694368 (D. Or. 1992)—decision affirmed by 42 F. 
3d 1522 (9*h Cir. 1994)—cert, denied by Clouser v. Glickman, 515 U.S. 1141 (1995)— 
rehearing denied by Clouser v. Glickman, 515 U.S. 1178 (1995).
Background
Three mining claims were at issue, two of which were part of the National 
Wilderness Preservation System and one of which was part of the Wild and 
Scenic Rivers System. The Robert E. mining claim was in the Kalmiopsis 
Wilderness in the Siskiyou National Forest, Thunderbolt Claim # 2  was in the 
N orth Fork John Day Wilderness Area in the Umatilla National Forest, and the 
Wilson Placer mining claim was on the Illinois River (which is part of the Wild 
and Scenic River System) in the Siskiyou National Forest.
This case was a lawsuit brought against the Department of Agriculture's 
Forest Service by three mining claim holders. The claim holders challenged the 
Forest Service's rulings that pack animals were required to access mining claims 
rather than motorized vehicles.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Leroy Clouser and Sharon Clouser (OwneiS of Robert E. Mining Claims), 
Carl E. Setera, Judith M. Setera, Anthony S. Setera and Lois A. Setera (Owners of
40
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the Thunderbolt Mining Claims), Gary Hoefler, Don Wurster, Cameron 
Anderson and Robin Anderson (Owners of the Wilson Mining Claim).
The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to permit motorized 
access to mining claims on public land.
The plaintiffs contended that: (1) the Department of Interior had 
"exclusive jurisdiction" over mining claim validity; (2) the Forest Service could 
not prohibit motorized transport as a method of access to a claim while the 
Department of Interior was determining the claim's validity; (3) the plaintiffs 
representing the Thunderbolt Claim #2 argued that the trails they wished to 
travel via motorized transport constituted public highways and were therefore 
not in the Forest Service's jurisdiction (16 U.S.C.A. § 551); and (4) they claimed 
that existing trails were "public right-of-ways under Revised Statutes (R.S.) §
2477 and that according to 36 C.F.R. § 228.4(a), the permittees did not need to 
submit a plan of operation if the operations "... will be limited to the use of 
vehicles on existing public roads or roads used ... for National Forest purposes." 
D efendants' Identities and Contentions
Mike Espy, Secretary of Agriculture, United States of America; Dale 
Robertson, Chief Forester, Forest Service; John Butruille, Regional Forester, 
Pacific Northwest Region; Jeff Blackwood, Forest Supervisor, Umatilla National 
Forest; Craig Smith Dixon, District Ranger, North Fork John Day Ranger District; 
Mike Lunn, Forest Supervisor, Siskiyou National Forest; Dermis Holthus, District 
Ranger, Illinois Valley Ranger District; Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior; Cy
Access to Mining Claims
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
Jamison, Director of the Bureau of Land Management; D. Dean Bibles, State 
Director, Oregon State Office.
The district court had granted summary judgment to the defendants. The 
defendants contended that: (1) as a m atter of law, the Forest Service has the 
authority to regulate access to mining claims in wilderness; (2) the Forest Service 
has the authority to regulate access while the Department of Interior is reviewing 
claim validity; (3) the Forest Service was proper in regulating motorized access to 
mining claims; and (4) the Forest Service was correct in stating that trails were 
not public right-of-ways.
Case Issues
(1) Does the Department of Interior or the Department of Agriculture, 
through the Forest Service, have jurisdiction and statutory authority over access 
to mining claims in wilderness areas within national forest land?
(2) Does the Forest Service have jurisdiction to prevent motorized access 
while the Department of Interior is assessing the validity of the plaintiffs mining 
claim?
(3) Were the Forest Service's rulings preventing the use of motorized 
vehicles to access mining claims in wilderness areas proper?
(4) Are national forest trails public right-of-ways?
Access to Mining Claims
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Court's Holdings
On jurisdiction and statutory authority: The court held that the Forest
Service has jurisdiction over access to mining claims in wilderness areas,
according to the Wilderness Act of 1964 which states;
»
In any case where valid mining claims or other valid occupancies 
are wholly within a designated national forest wilderness area, the 
Secretary of Agriculture shall by reasonable regulations consistent 
w ith the preservation of the area as wilderness, permit ingress and 
egress to such surrounded areas by means which have been or are 
being customarily enjoyed w ith respect to other such areas 
similarly situated. 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b).
In the Wilson claim, the Wilderness Act does not apply. However, the 
Forest Service maintains statutory authority to regulate mining claim access 
through the Organic Administration Act of 1897. Therefore, even though the 
Wilson claim is part of the National Wild and Scenic River System, the Forest 
Service has statutory authority to regulate mining claim access.^
On Forest Service motorized access restrictions while Interior considered 
claim: The court determined that changes in motorized access are authorized 
under the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b), and the Forest Service's own 
regulations at 36 C.F.R. § 228.15. The plaintiffs referred to 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(a) 
which applies to the Department of Interior stating that "a decision will not be 
effective during the time in which a person adversely affected may file a notice of 
ap p e a l...." The court determined that, legally, the Department of Interior and
Access to Mining Claims
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the Department of Agriculture could take different positions on the mining 
claim.
The Interior department regulation does not purport to instruct 
other agencies such as Agriculture about how to treat putative 
mining claims during the pendency of appeals in validity 
proceedings ... Interior has taken one position. Agriculture another, 
and we see no reason why such a divergence is impermissible as a 
matter of law. 42 F. 3d 1522 (9‘̂  Cir.1994).
Moreover, the Forest Service ruled in a timely manner on the plaintiffs' plan of
operation—it modified the plan to exclude motorized access, using its authority
under 36 C.F.R. § 228.5(a).
On the Forest Service rulings preventing motorized access to mining
claims: The court upheld the Forest Service rulings that the plaintiffs could not
access mining claims via motorized transport. The court supported the Forest
Service's rulings that the trails were not public highways and that motorized
access was not "essential" to the operation of the claims nor "customarily used
with respect to other such claims." See 36 C.F.R. §§ 228.15(b) and (c).
On whether trails were public "right of ways": The court held that the
trails in question, which had been closed to traffic for ten years and were
returning to their natural state, did not constitute public right-of-ways.^
' However, the court found that the W ilson claim plaintiffs failed to exhaust their 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. As a result, those plaintiffs’ 
claims were dismissed.
 ̂The court further held that plaintiffs’ takings claim could not be used in district 
court as miners were seeking equitable relief from the Forest Service’s denial o f  
motorized access. Rather, miners would need to seek money damages under Tucker Act 
in Court o f  Federal Claims. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a)(2).
Access to Mining Claims
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Result
The court held that the Forest Service was correct in prohibiting motorized 
access to mining claims.
O ther Cases Referenced
Standard of review—United States v. City of Spokane, 918 F. 2d 84,86 (9*̂
Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1250, 111 S. Ct. 2888.
Forest Service authority to regulate—United States v. Weiss, 642 F. 2d 296, 
298 (9‘h Cir. 1981); United States v. Richardson, 599 F. 2d 290 (9*  Cir. 1979), cert, 
denied, 444 U.S. 1014[, 100 S. Ct. 663] (1980); United States v, Coldfield Deep Mines 
Co., 644 F. 2d 1307,1309 (9*  Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 907,102 S. Ct. 1252; 
United States v. Doremus, 888 F. 2d 630,632 (9*̂  Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 
1046, 111 S. Ct. 751.
Exhaustion requirements under the Administrative Procedures Act— 
Darby v. Cisneros, —U.S. —, —, 113 S. Ct. 2539,2548 (1993); Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, —U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 2767 (1992); El Rescate Legal Serv. v. EOIR, 959 
F. 2d 742 (9*h Cir. 1992).
Grounds on which plaintiffs challenge Forest Service rulings—United 
States V. Barrows, 404 F. 2d 749 (9*  Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 394 U.S. 974, 89 S. Ct. 
1468 (1969); Adams v. Witmer, 271 F. 2d 29,33 (9* Cir. 1958); Marsh v. Oregon 
Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360,378[, 109 S. Ct. 1851,1861 (1989); United 
States V. Vogler, 859 F. 2d 638 (9* Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1006,109 S. Ct. 
787 (1989).
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Takings claim—Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 
697 n. 18[, 69 S. Ct. 1457,1465 n. 18](1949); Hurley v. Kinkaid, 285 U.S. 9 5 ,104[, 52 
S. Ct. 267,269] (1932); United States-v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,267[, 66 S. Ct. 1062, 
1068] (1946); Yearsley v. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18,60 S. Ct. 413,414, 
(1940); Ruckleshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,1016-17,104 S. Ct. 2862,2879-80 
(1984).
Access to Mining Claims
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Stupak-Thrall v. United States 
843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994)
Case History
843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994)-~affirmed by 70 F. 3d 881 (6* Cir.
1995)—rehearing En Banc granted, opinion vacated by 81 F. 3d 651—AND on 
rehearing En Banc 89 F. 3d 1269—cert, denied by 519 U.S. 1090.
Background
The Sylvania Wilderness in the Ottawa National Forest is part of the 
National Wilderness Preservation System. The plaintiffs, who owned land along 
the shore of Crooked Lake, shared surface rights of the lake with the federal 
government since 90 percent of the lake falls within the Sylvania Wilderness.
The Forest Service amended the Ottawa National Forest Land and Resource 
Management Plan with the contested Amendment No. 1. Amendment No. 1 
prohibited the use of houseboats and sailboats on Crooked Lake in the Sylvania 
Wilderness Area in Michigan's Upper Peninsula and restricted the use of 
"electronic fish-finders, boom-boxes, and other mechanical or battery-operated 
devices." 843 F. Supp. at 327.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Kathy Stupak-Thrall, Michael A. Gajewski, and Bodil Gajewski, Plaintiffs- 
Appellants. The three plaintiffs own and operate businesses on the shore of 
Crooked Lake.
47
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Plaintiffs argued that (1) the Forest Service acted outside its statutory 
authority and that (2) its actions were unconstitutional when it issued 
Amendment No. 1 to its land and resource management plan for the Sylvania 
Wilderness Area.
Defendants' Identities and Contentions
United States of America and Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary of 
Agriculture, individually and in his official capacity, defendants-appellees.
The defendants claimed that the Amendment was within statutory and 
constitutional power of the federal government.
Case Issues
(1) Does Congress have the authority to regulate riparian rights of private 
citizens?
(2) Does Michigan's "reasonable use" doctrine apply to the federal 
govermnent's sovereign power to regulate waters.
Court's Holdings
On Congress's authority to regulate the riparian rights of private citizen's: 
The court found that Congress had the power to regulate private riparian rights 
of citizens who lived along the edge of the lake.
The Property Clause of the Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2, permits 
Congress to promulgate rules and regulations to protect federal property. The 
Constitution states: "Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
Riparian Rights
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belonging to the United States." In the present situation, the court held that 
Congress's authority included the regulation of private property when it is 
within the best interest of federal property. The court referred to Supreme Court 
cases Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518,17 S. Ct. 864,42 L.Ed. 260 (1987); 
United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264,266,47 S. Ct. 597,598,71 L.Ed. 1040 (1927); 
and Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,538,96 S. Ct. 2285,2290,49 L.Ed. 2d 34 
(1976).
The court referred to precedents, U.S. v. Brown and Minnesota v. Block, in 
which the courts relied on Kleppe and Camfield to determine that (1) Congress had 
the power to regulate state-owned waters within the boundaries of a national 
park; and (2) that Congress had the power to restrict motorboat usage on state- 
owned waters within federal wilderness. United States v. Brown, 552 F. 2d 817 (8 “̂  
Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 431 U.S. 949,97 S. Ct. 2666,53 L.Ed. 2d 266 (1977). 
Minnesota v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240 (8*̂  Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1007,102 S. 
Ct. 1645,71 L.Ed. 2d 876 (1982).
On the application of Michigan's "reasonable use" doctrine to the 
promulgation of Amendment No. I 's  regulation of private riparian rights: The 
court held that Michigan's "reasonable use" doctrine applied to the regulation of 
Crooked Lake. In order to determine whether the restrictions under Amendment 
No. 1 were permissible, the court had to decide whether the Amendment fell 
under the "reasonable use" doctrine.
Riparian Rights
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Michigan's "reasonable use" doctrine separates riparian rights into two 
catagories: natural and artificial. "Natural purposes" include "those absolutely 
necessary for the existence of the riparian proprietor." "Artificial purposes" 
include "those which merely increase one's comfort and prosperity." Thompson 
V. Enz, 379 Mich. 667,154 N.W. 2d 473,483-84 (1967). The court found that the 
restrictions placed on the private citizens' riparian rights by Amendment No. 1 
were reasonable considering the greater purpose of protecting the surrounding 
wilderness area. Under Michigan's "reasonable use" doctrine, the Forest Service 
was not infringing on the natural riparian rights of the plaintiffs so that the 
Forest Service's restrictions were not unreasonable.
The Michigan Wilderness Act (MWA) states that management of the 
Sylvania Wilderness Area must correspond with the conditions of the national 
Wilderness Act of 1964. The national Wilderness Act requires each wilderness 
area to be preserved according to its wilderness character. Therefore 
Amendment No. 1 provided reasonable restrictions. The court decided that the 
Forest Service was fulfilling its role in preserving the wilderness character of the 
Sylvania Wilderness according to the Wilderness Act.
Result
The district court granted the defendant's motions for summary judgment 
and denied the plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and declared the 
amendment lawful.
Riparian Rights
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O ther Cases Referenced
Riparian rights—Hall v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112,116,57 N.W. 2d 462,464 
(1953); Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659,661,23 N.W. 2d 117,119-20 (1946).
Standard of review—Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29,41,103 S.Ct. 2856,2865, 77 L.Ed. 2d 443 (1983); Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. V. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,842-43,104 S.Ct. 2778, 
2781-82,81 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1984); Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industrials v. United 
States, 913 F. 2d 933,937 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Social Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S.
358,369,66 S. Ct. 637,643,90 L.Ed. 718 (1946)); Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F. Supp. 900, 
905 (D.D.C. 1990), a ff  d, 937 F. 2d 623 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1075, 
112 S. Ct. 974,117 L.Ed. 2d 138 (1992).
Valid existing rights— United States v. Underhill, 813 F. 2d 105, 111 (6* Cir. 
1987) (citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,570,102 S. Ct. 3245, 
3249,73 L.Ed. 2d 973 (1982), cert, denied, 482 U.S. 906,107 S. Ct. 2484,96 L.Ed. 2d 
376 (1987).
Regulation under police powers: Square Lake Hills Condominium Ass'n v. 
Bloomfield Tzvp., 437 Mich. 310, 322,471 N.W. 2d 321,326 (1991), reh'g denied, 437 
Mich. 1280,472 N.W. 2d 287 (1991); Miller v. Fabius Township Bd., St. Joseph 
County, 366 Mich. 250,258-60,114 N.W. 2d 205,209-10 (1962); Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. 529,96 S. Ct. 2285,49 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1976); Camfield v. United 
States, 167 U.S. 518,17 S. Ct. 864,42 L. Ed. 260 (1987); United States v. Lindsey, 595 
F. 2d 5 (9* Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 552 F. 2d 817 (1977), cert, denied, 431
Riparian Rights
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U.S. 949,97 S. Ct. 2666,53 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1977); Minnesota by Alexander v. Block,
660 F. 2d 1240 (8* Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 1007,102 S. Ct. 1645,71 L. Ed.
2d 876 (1982).
Reasonable use: Thompson v. Enz, 379 Mich. 667,687,154 N.W. 2d 473,484 
(1967); Pierce v. Riley, 35 Mich. App. 122,192 N. W. 2d 366 (1971); Kleppe v. New 
Mexico, 426 U.S. at 540,96 S. Ct. at 2292.
Riparian Rights
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Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman 
988 F. Supp. 1055 (W.D. Mich. 1997)
Background
The plaintiffs owned property along the shore of Crooked Lake which lies 
w ithin the Sylvania Wilderness, which is part of the National Wilderness 
Preservation System, in the Ottawa National Forest. The plaintiffs argued that 
Amendment No. 5 of the Ottawa National Forest Land and Resource 
Management Plan, regulating the use of gas-powered motorboats on parts of 
Crooked Lake, was beyond the authority of the Forest Service.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Kathy Stupak-Thrall; Michael A. Gajewski; and Bodil Gajewski, Plaintiffs. 
The plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service lacked the authority to 
regulate the use of gas-powered motorboats on parts of Crooked Lake in the 
Sylvania Wilderness.
Defendants' Identities and Contentions
Daniel Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture; Michael P. Dombeck, Chief of 
the United States Forest Service; Bob Jacobs, Regional Forester for Region IX of 
the United States Forest Service; Phyllis Green, Forest Supervisor of the Ottawa 
National Forest; and the United States Forest Service; defendants.
The defendants contended that the regulation was within the authority of 
the Forest Service.
Riparian Rights
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Case Issues
(1) Did earlier litigation bar this case from being heard?
(2) Did the plaintiffs have a valid existing right in the use of motorboats 
on Crooked Lake?
(3) Did the Forest Service have the authority to "promulgate rule 
preventing use of gas-powered motorboats" inside the Sylvania Wilderness?
(4) Did Amendment No. 5 to the Forest Service's Land and Resource 
Management Plan constitute a "taking" of personal property under the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution?
Court's Holdings
On whether earlier case barred the hearing of present suit: The District 
court held that earlier litigation (see summary for Stupak-Thrall v. U.S., 843 F. 
Supp. 327) did not exclude the present case from being heard.
The plaintiffs had brought a case against the United States concerning 
Amendment No. 1 to the Ottawa National Forest Land and Resource 
Management Plan. In the earlier litigation, the court held that the Forest 
Service's amendment regulating use of sailboats and electronic items (ex. 
boomboxes) was reasonable and w ithin the authority of the Forest Service. The 
defendants argued that the present issue (of the Forest Service's authority to 
promulgate regulations governing Crooked Lake) was resolved in earlier 
litigation. See Stupak-Thrall v. U.S., 843 F. Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (Quist, J.), 
a fd ,  70 F. 3d 881 (6‘h Cir. 1995), vacated, 81 F. 3d 651 (6* Cir. 1996), a fd  by an
Riparian Rights
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equally divided en banc court, 89 F. 3d 1269 (6* Cir. 1996), cert denied,—U.S. —, 117 
S. Ct. 674,136 L.Ed. 2d 711 (1997).
In the present case, the district court decided that the plaintiffs' arguments 
were different enough from the earlier litigation so that they were legitimate 
issues before the court. As motorboat use was not discussed in Stupak-Thrall I, 
and the defendants' have used motorboats actively in the past as an existing 
right, the court decided that the issue could be heard in court.i
On whether the plaintiffs' use of motorboats was a valid existing right:
The court held that the plaintiffs did have a valid existing right regarding the use 
of motorboats on Crooked Lake.
The plaintiffs showed that motorboat use had been an established use on 
Crooked Lake and that it was vital for their businesses. Stupak-Thrall showed 
that motorboat use was important for her livelihood through her rental business 
and had been for years. Hence, motorboat use was a valid existing right for 
Stupak-Thrall on Crooked Lake. Michael and Bodil Gajewski showed that 
motorboat use and rentals were crucial for their business's success. The Court 
found that motorboat use was a valid existing right for the Gajewskis as well.
On whether the Forest Service has the authority to promulgate 
Amendment No. 5 which regulated motorboat use on Crooked Lake: The court
’ The plaintiffs included a challenge to the snowmobile restrictions under 
Amendment No. 1 in their suit. The court stated that any Amendment No. 1 claims 
should have been raised in the earlier case and that it was no longer ripe.
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held that the Forest Service was unauthorized to pass Amendment No. 5 in the 
Ottawa National Forest Land and Resource Management Plan.
The court found that the National Wilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C. § 1131 
et seq., allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to restrict established uses of 
motorboats in wilderness areas as the Secretary found necessary. "Within 
wilderness areas designated by this chapter the use of aircraft or motorboats, 
where the uses have already become established, may be permitted to continue 
subject to such restrictions as the Secretary of Agriculture deems desirable." 16 
U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1). However, the court continued its consideration by pointing 
out that the Michigan Wilderness Act of 1987 (MWA), Fub.L. No. 100-184,101 
Stat. 1274, limited the Forest Servicers authority with special language not in the 
National Wilderness Act. Specifically, the MWA includes: "wilderness areas ... 
are to be managed 'in  accordance with the provisions of the Wilderness Act of 
1964,' that management is '[sjubject to valid existing rights.'" 988 F.Supp. at 
1062.
On whether Amendment No. 5 constituted a "taking": The court held that 
Amendment No. 5 did constitute a "taking" of private property without just 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Because the 
plaintiffs used motorboats as part of their family business, the court found that 
the restriction would negatively affect their businesses. Therefore, the 
government ought to have compensated the plaintiffs for their anticipated loss in
Riparian Rights
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business earnings as a result of the motorboat restrictions found in Amendment 
No. 5.
Result
The court found that motorboat restrictions on Crooked Lake constituted 
an unlawful act by the Forest Service and a taking under the Fifth Amendment.
However, the ruling applied only to Crooked Lake that has the unique 
situation of private citizens inhabiting its shoreline which depend on motorboat 
access for business.
The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. Finally, Amendment No. 5 was 
declared null and void in that it was beyond the authority of the Forest Service as 
granted by the MWA.
O ther Cases Referenced
Question of whether issue was previouslv litigated—Stupak-Thrall v.
United States, 843 F.Supp. 327 (W.D. Mich.1994) (Quist, J.), a fd ,  70 F. 3d 881 (6‘h 
Cir.1995), vacated, 81 F. 3d 651 (6* Cir.1996), aff'd by an equally divided en banc 
court, 89 F. 3d 1269 (6‘h Cir.1996), cert denied, —U.S. —, 117 S. Ct. 764,136 L.Ed. 2d 
711 (1997); Drummond v. Comm'r of Social Sec., 126 F. 3d 837,840 (6* Cir.1997); 
Heylinger v. State Univ. & Comm. College Sys., 126 F. 3d 849,852 (6“» Cir.1997) 
(quoting Barnes v. McDowell, 848 F. 2d 725,728 n. 5 (6* Cir.1988) cert, denied, 488 
U.S. 1007,109 S. Ct. 789,102 L.Ed. 2d 780 (1989)); Id (quoting Migra v. Y^arren City 
School Dist. Bd. ofEduc., 465 U.S. 75,77 n. 1,104 S. Ct. 892,894 n. 1,79 L.Ed. 2d 56
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(1984)); Drummond (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,94,101 S. Ct. 411,414- 
415,66 L.Ed. 2d 308 (1980)); Sanders Confectionary Products v. Heller Financial, 973 
F. 2d 474,480 (6‘̂  Cir.1992), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 1079,113 S. Ct. 1046,122 L.Ed.
2d 355 (1993); Central Transport, Inc. v. Four Phase Systems, Inc., 936 F. 2d 256,259 
(6‘hCir.l991).
Arbitrary and capricious action bv Forest Service?—Louisiana Public Serv. 
Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355,374,106 S. Ct. 1890,1901,90 L.Ed. 2d 369 (1986).
"Valid existing rights"—Ha// v. Wantz, 336 Mich. 112,116-17,57 N.W. 2d 
462 (1953); Burt v. Munger, 314 Mich. 659,663-64,23 N.W. 2d 117 (1946); Pierce v. 
Riley, 81 Mich.App. 39,45, 264 N.W. 2d 110,114 (1978); Thompson v. Enz, 379 
Mich. 667,154 N.W. 2d 473,476 (1967).
Statutory construction—United States v. Bazel, 80 F. 3d 1140,1145 (6* 
Cir.1996), cert.denied, —U.S. —, 117 S. Ct. 210,136 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1996).
Plain meaning of statute—Audette v. Sullivan, 19 F. 3d 254,256 (6* 
Cir.1994); Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,253-54,112 S. Ct. 1146, 
1149,117 L.Ed. 2d 391 (1992); Id at 254,112 S. Ct. at 1149 (quoting Rubin v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 424,430,101 S. Ct. 698,701-02,66 L.Ed. 2d 633 (1981).
Personal property taking—Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003,1014-15,112 S. Ct. 2886,2892-93,120 L.Ed. 2d 798, 812 (1992) (quoting 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415,43 S. Ct. 158,160,67 L.Ed. 322 
(1922)); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,262,100 S. Ct. 2138,2142,65 L.Ed. 2d 106
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(1980) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,179-80,100 S. Ct. 383,392- 
93,62L.Ed. 2d 332 (1979)).
Michigan riparian rights—Peterman v. State Department of Natural Resources, 446 
Mich. 177,521 N.W. 2d 499 (1994); Mumaugh v. McCarley, 219 Mich.App. 641,646, 
558 N.W. 2d 433,435 (1996); Difronzo v. Village of Port Sanilac, 166 Mich.App. 148, 
152,419 N.W. 2d 756 (1988); Id (quoting Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198,225,233 
N.W. 159 (1930).
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McGratl & Rowley v. Babbitt 
986 F. Supp. 1386 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
Background
This case involved Boca Grande Island, which lies within the Key West 
National Wildlife Refuge (KWNWR). The KWNWR, established in 1908, is 
managed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Islands within 
the refuge were designated part of the National Wilderness Preservation System 
under the Wildlife Act of 1964. Pub. L. 88-577.
The FWS and State of Florida Department of Natural Resources developed 
a new management plan for two wildlife refuges, including the KNNWR, in 1992 
called the "Management Agreement for Submerged Land Within the Boundaries 
of the Key West and Great Heron National Wildlife Refuges." The objectives of 
the Plan included protecting Boca Grande Key and its ecosystem.
The plan required permits for commercial operations within the wildlife 
refuges. A permit application process was designed. Permits would be awarded 
to commercial enterprises whose use was compatible with the purposes of the 
refuge.
McGrail and Rowley, Inc. (MRI), were commercial operators, running 
passengers via catamaran to Boca Grand Key. The FWS alerted MRI in January 
1994 that a permit was required. MRI applied for a permit June 23,1994. The 
FWS denied its application August 3,1994, stating that MRI's use of the refuge 
was incompatible with the purposes of the refuge. MRI continued to carry
60
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passengers via catamaran to the key w ithout a permit. In October 1994, MRI 
appealed the FWS's decision. FWS responded by not processing the appeal, 
claiming, "'an  appeal is meaningless' so long as MRI continued to use the refuge 
for commercial purposes without a permit." 986 F. Supp. at 1390. MRI filed suit 
against the FWS March 10,1995, hoping the court would order the process of 
MRI's appeal as well as decide several other issues relating to the commercial 
permit process and operation within the refuge.
The court issued temporary restraining orders (TROs) March 21,1995.
First, the court forbid the government from seizing any of MRI's boats or from 
arresting any of the captains working for MRI. Second, the court prohibited MRI 
from breaking any federal laws relating to the KWNWR.
After the TROs were in place, FWS alerted MRI that it was proceeding 
with MRI's appeal. On May 22,1995 the FWS Regional Director upheld the 
permit denial.
Now that the FWS processed MRI's appeal. Count 1 in this suit was moot. 
The other issues were addressed.
Plaintiff's Identities and Contentions
McGrail and Rowley, Inc., plaintiff.
McGrail and Rowley owned McGrail and Rowley, Inc. (MRI), a business 
running catamarans in the waters off Key West, Florida. MRI filed suit to order 
the FWS to file its permit application appeal and to resolve several issues 
concerning the FWS management and perm it process, (see below)
Commercial Boat Use in Wildlife Refuge
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Herbert Pontin, plaintiff.
Pontin, a captain for MRI, was cited for refuge trespass while operating an 
individual jet ski. He challenged the FWS action for citing him with a Notice of 
Violation for trespassing in refuge waters.
D efendants' Identities
Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of ^ e  United States Department of the Interior, 
and several officials of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), 
defendants.
The defendants argued that the permit application process was legitimate 
and that the plaintiffs application was properly denied.
Case Issues
(1) What is the extent of judicial review for actions taken by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service? If subject to the court's review, what is the scope of judicial 
review?
(2) Did the FWS act in "bad faith?"
(3) Was the FWS action "arbitrary and capricious?"
(4) Was the FWS Refuge Manual binding on FWS actions?
(5) Did the FWS have authority over state lands and waters?
(6) How should refuge boundary violations be resolved?
Court's Holdings
On the extent of judicial review: The court held that the actions of the 
FWS were reviewable under § 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.
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§ 701 et seq. Section 706 requires the court to restrict its review to the agency's 
administrative record.
The court could expand its review beyond the administrative record 
providing it could prove allegations that the FWS acted in "bad faith."
On whether the FWS acted in "bad faith": The court held that while the 
FWS acted in "bad faith" by refusing to process MRI's appeal, it found that the 
agency did not act in "bad faith" in the decision-making process.
On whether the agency's actions were arbitrary and capricious: The court 
held that the agency's decision that MRI's uses were incompatible with the 
purposes of the refuge was not arbitrary and capricious. The refuge and 
wilderness within it were established to protect wildlife, birds and their habitat. 
MRI's business ventures, including frisbee in the shallow water on the beach and 
kayaking around the shore, were found to have potentially negative impacts on 
the sensitive ecosystem of the keys. In reviewing the agency's decision, the court 
found that it acted appropriately.
On whether the FWS Manual was binding on FWS actions: The court 
found that the FWS Manual was not binding on FWS actions. While the manual 
provided guidance to the FWS, the court found no precedents in which manuals 
were found binding.
On whether the FWS had the authority to regulate non-federal lands and 
waters: The court held that the FWS had the authority to regulate commercial 
use of federal lands including submerged lands and adjacent state waters. The
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authority was vested in the FWS through the Property Clause of the 
Constitution. The Property Clause states "The Congress shall have Power to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory 
or other Property belonging to the United States . . 9 8 6  F. Supp. at 1394 quoting 
The Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2. In United States v. Lindsey, 595 F. 2d 5,6 (9* 
Cir. 1979), the court expanded the federal government's authority to include, 
"non-federal land 'w hen reasonably necessary to protect adjacent federal 
property or navigable waters.'" 986 F. Supp. at 1394. Therefore, the court held 
that the FWS was acting within its authority in regulating access to state-owned 
waters off Boca Grande Key.
On how trespass violations should be resolved: The court held that 
because the payment schedule for refuge trespasses was defective, it could not 
decide on the plaintiffs' challenge to agency authority.
Administrative Order 89-39, by United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Florida, established that refuge trespass violations could be 
resolved with paym ent of fines. The court held that refuge violations were 
classified as Petty A violations. Petty B violations, according to Local Rule 88.4 
could be resolved w ith paym ents in collateral. The court found that because 
refuge trespasses were Petty A offenses, the Administrative Order 89-39 was in 
violation of Local Rule 88.4 and was therefore, null and void.
Commercial Boat Use in Wildlife Refuge
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Result
The court held that the FWS acted appropriately in denying the plaintiffs 
permit application. The court ordered MRI to provide an account of fees and 
costs for reimbursement under Equal Access to Justice Act.
O ther Cases Referenced
Administrative Procedure Act—Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 
U.S. 729,105 S. Ct. 1598,84 L.Ed. 2d 643 (1985); Organized Fisherman of Florida, Inc. 
V. Franklin, 846 F. Supp. 1569,1573 (S.D. Fla. 1994); Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,
142,93 S. Ct. 1241,1243,36 L.Ed. 2d 106 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 
Inc. V. Volpe, 410 U.S. 402,416,91 S. Ct. 814,823,28 L.Ed. 2d 136 (1971); Bowman 
Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 419 U.S. 281,286,95 S. Ct. 438,442,42 
L.Ed. 2d 447 (1974).
Enforcement of Specific Refuge Manual Provision—Hamlet v. United 
States, 63 F. 3d 1097,1103 (Fed.Cir. 1995); Lumber, Production and Industrial 
Workers Log Scalers Local 2058 v. United States, 580 F. Supp. 279 (D.Or.l984); 
Western Radio Services Co., Inc. v. Espy, 79 F. 3d 896 (9* Cir. 1996).
Federal Authority over State-Owned Lands—United States v. Lindsey, 595 
F. 2d 5 ,6  (9* Cir. 1979); State of Minnesota by Alexander v. Block, 660 F. 2d 1240 (8*̂  
Cir. 1981).
Qualified Immunity—Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818,102 S. Ct.
2727,2738,73 L.Ed. 2d 396 (1982).
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Attorney's Fees—Dow v. Busbee, 684 F. 2d 1375,1379 (11* Cir. 1982);
Iranian Students Ass'n v. Sawyer, 639 F. 2d 1160,1163 (5* Cir. 1981); Martin v. 
Heckler, 773 F. 2d 1145,1149 (11* Cir. 1985); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F. 2d 458, 
465 (5* Cir. 1981); United States v. 4880 5.E. Dixie Highway, 838 F. 2d 1558,1561 
(11* Cir. 1988); Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jean, 496 
U.S. 154,159 n. 7,110 S. Ct. 2316,2319 n. 7,110 L.Ed. 2d 134 (1990); Pierce v. 
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552,566,108 S. Ct. 2541,2550,101 L.Ed. 2d 490 (1988); Taylor 
Group, Inc. v. Johnson, 919 F. Supp. 1545,1549 (M.D.Ala.l996).
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National Audubon Society v. Hodel 
606 F. Supp. 825 (D. Alaska 1984)
Background
The Secretary of Interior exchanged St. Matthew Island, a wilderness area, 
within the Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge for lands in two other 
wildlife refuges, the Kenai and Yukon Delta National Wildlife Refuges, on 
August 10,1983, to several corporations. The corporations. Cook Inlet Region, 
Inc., Calista Corp., and Sea Lion Corp., known as CIRI, were native Alaskan 
corporations. After the suits were filed, the Secretary defended his actions under 
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). 16 U.S.C. § 3192(h),
The lawsuits were brought by plaintiffs concerned about the probable loss 
of a treasured wilderness area that provided crucial habitat for wildlife and 
birds. CIRI planned to excavate oil and gas from the area, an action which could 
damage the ecosystem of St. M atthew Island. A draft environmental statement 
outlined possible plans, including a potential pipeline to St. Matthew Island or 
offshore loading with facilities to be built on St. Matthew Island.
The Alaska Maritime National Wildlife Refuge was designated for 
environmental protection under ANILCA in 1980. 43 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1982). 
St. Matthew was designated as wilderness under the national Wilderness Act, 16 
U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq, on October 23,1970. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
(ANSCA), which passed in 1971,43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982), was enacted as a 
settlement concerning Native claims of subsistence use and occupation of
67
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Alaskan lands. ANILCA and ANCSA are interrelated in the present case 
because some ANCSA provisions were incorporated into ANILCA's statutory 
framework.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
National Audubon Society, Bering Sea Fishermens' Association, Trustees 
for Alaska, the Wilderness Society, Defenders of Wildlife, National Wildlife 
Refuge Association, Friends of the Earth, Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.
In case A83-425, the plaintiffs' sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 
First, plaintiffs sought judicial declaration that the Secretary's land exchange was 
unlawful and invalid, and second, the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction 
preventing the defendants from completing the proposed plan of activity on St. 
Matthew Island.
In case A84-401, the plaintiffs' argued that the defendants' suggested plan 
to fill in wetlands would require CIRI to have a permit from the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps).
In case A84-402, the plaintiffs' argued that an Environmental Impact 
Statement was required before the oil and gas exploration project could continue. 
D efendants' Identities and Contentions
Donald P. Hodel, William P. Horn, Robert Jantzen, Keith Schreiner, Cook 
Inlet Region, Inc., Calista Corporation, Sea Lion Corporation, Malcolm Baldridge, 
John V. Bryne.
Land Exchange in Alaska
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Defendants argued that the Secretary's actions were not subject to judicial 
review.
CIRI argued that the land exchange created a private inholding, which 
was not subject to federal restrictions as long as the Regional Director received 
construction and operation plans for comment.
Case Issues
(1) Was the Secretary of Interior's decision reviewable by the court?
(2) What is the standard of review for the Secretary's decision?
(3) What did the court decide on the legality of the land exchange?
Court's Holdings
On whether the Secretary's decision was reviewable: The court held that 
the Secretary's decision was reviewable. In rejecting CIRI's claim that the 
Secretary's actions were unreviewable, the court cited earlier cases in which 
agency decisions for the "public interest" were reviewable. Ninth Circuit Judge 
Wright found that judicial review was precluded only in cases when "statutes 
are draw n so broadly that in a given case 'there is no law to apply.'" 606 F. Supp. 
at 834. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582,101 S. Ct. 1266,67 L.Ed.
2d 521 (1980), and Keating v. Federal Aviation Administration, 610 F. 2d 611 (9* Cir. 
1979).
The court concluded that the Secretary's decision was reviewable under 
the requirements of § 1302(h) of ANILCA. The court looked at the language of 
ANILCA and its specifications directing the Secretary's actions. Under ANILCA,
Land Exchange in Alaska
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the Secretary must meet two requirements before a land exchange is approved. 
First, the land exchange m ust be '"for the purposes of [ANILCA]." Second, the 
land exchange is to be in "the public interest" in the case that the lands involved 
are of unequal value. 16 U.S.C. § 3192(h) (1982). Therefore, the court may review 
the Secretary's actions to determine whether he fulfilled his statutory duty to 
make a final decision in the public's interest.
On the standard of review for the Secretary's decision: The court held that 
the Secretary's actions should be reviewed under the "arbitrary and capricious" 
standard. Precedents (stated above) determined that the Ninth Circuit Court 
applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to earlier cases.
The court also held that in reviewing the Secretary's decision, it must limit 
itself to the Secretary's factors and consideration thereof, rather than including its 
own judgment. The Secretary's actions were explained in two documents. The 
Department of Interior's Record of Decision and the Public Interest Determination for 
the Proposed Acquisition of Inholdings in Kenai and Yukon Delta National Wildlife 
Refuges by Exchange for Lands on St. Matthew Island, Alaska. The Record of 
Decision described the documents used and referred to in the decision process. 
The Public Interest Determination outlined the factors considered in the decision 
and the explanations for the final decision made by the Secretary. Therefore, the 
court considered the Public Interest Determination and Record of Decision in 
making its conclusions about the legality of the St. Matthew Island land 
exchange.
Land Exchange in Alaska
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What did the court decide about the Secretary's actions: In consideration 
of the evidence before the Secretary, the court held that the Secretary's decision 
was an abuse of discretion. While the Secretary had determined that the lands 
received in exchange for St. Matthew Island enhanced the national wildlife and 
conservation worth, the court decided that the Secretary erred in his judgment.
The Yukon E>elta lands received in the exchange were put under a non­
development easement in the Kokechik Bay. These 8,000 acres were home to 
numerous nesting and brood rearing waterfowl. The court decided that while 
the land was enormously valuable, it was already protected. As part of the Delta 
NWR, the area was under the authority of § 22(g) of ANCSA which states that 
"every patent issued by the Secretary pursuant to this chapter—which covers 
lands lying within the boundaries of a National Wildlife Refuge on December 18, 
1971—shall contain a provision that such lands remain subject to the laws and 
regulations governing use and development of such Refuge." 43 U.S.C. § 1621(g)
(1982) (emphasis added).
The land exchange granted the Secretary 1100 acres on Nunivak Island. 
The island is part of the Yukon Delta NWR so that conservation of wildlife is one 
of its primary purposes. The land is also incorporated in ANCSA as an area in 
which native activities that are compatible with refuge purposes are permitted. 
Section 14(h) and § 22(g). 43 U.S.C. § 1613(h) (1982)
The land exchange included 2254 acres of CIRI claims in the Kenai NWR. 
Again, these lands were largely protected as part of the refuge. Overall, the court
Land Exchange in Alaska
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decided that these lands were already protected from incompatible uses so that 
the land exchange did not present a significant benefit to national conservation 
values.
Despite these determinations, the court decided that the Secretary's 
actions were not arbitrary or capricious because the land exchange ensured the 
recreational objectives of the refuge.
However, the court found that the Secretary's determination that the land 
exchange would not have a permanent impact on St. Matthew was incorrect.
(For summary of potential damage, see 606 F. Supp. at 843-44).
In the Public Interest Determination, the Secretary found the exchanges to 
be favorable for wildlife refuge and conservation worth. He also determined that 
St. M atthew would not suffer long-term environmental damage. Under § 22(g) 
of ANCSA and § 304(b) of ANILCA, the Secretary is allowed to permit activities 
on refuges only if they are "compatible" with the refuge's purposes. 606 F. Supp. 
at 842. The Secretary claimed that the oil development would be compatible 
with the refuge's purpose and that disturbances would be temporary.
In light of the potential long-term environmental damage to St. Matthew 
Island, the court determined that national conservation objectives would not be 
better off from the exchange and that the increased recreational opportunities in 
the Kenai and Yukon Delta NWRs did not mitigate the negative impacts of the 
land exchange.
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Result
The preliminary injunction was granted based on the Secretary's abuse of 
discretion. The court declared the land exchange invalid.
O ther Cases Referenced
Standing—Kale v. United States, 489 F. 2d 449,454 (9* Cir. 1973); Raypath, 
Inc. V. City of Anchorage, 544 F. 2d 1019 (9̂  ̂Cir. 1976); Rowe v. United States, 464 F. 
Supp. 1060,1075 (D.Alaska 1979), a jf d in part and rev'd in part, 633 F. 2d 799 (9**̂ 
Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 970,101 S. Ct. 2047.
Reviewability of Secretary's Decision—Lewis v. Hickel, 427 F. 2d 673 (9*
Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 992,91 S. Ct. 456; National Forest Preservation Group 
V. Butz, 458 F. 2d 408 (9*̂  Cir. 1973); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 
101 S. Ct. 1266; Keating v. Federal Aviation Administration, 610 F. 2d 611 (9* Cir. 
1979).
Review of Secretary's Public Interest Determination—Chevron U.S.A., Inc. 
V. NRDC, —U.S.— 104 S. Ct. 2778; NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662,96 S. Ct. 1806, 
Confederated Tribes & Bands v. F.E.R.C., 746 F. 2d 466 (9* Cir. 1984); People of the 
Village ofGambell v. Clark, 746 F. 2d 572 (9* Cir. 1984); Environmental Defense Fund 
v. Andrus, 596 F. 2d 848 (9‘h Cir. 1979) (citing Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F. 2d 1111 (9* 
Cir. 1971)).
Granting injunctive relief—American Motorcyclist Association v. Watt, 714 F. 
2d 962 (9* Cir. 1983).
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Sierra Club v. Lyng 
663 F. Supp. 556 (D. D.C. 1987)
Case History
Case followed temporary injunction in earlier case. Sierra Club v. Block, 614 
F. Supp. 488.
Background
This case was brought by environmental organizations against the 
Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) concerning a program implemented in 
wilderness areas to control Southern Pine Beetle infestations.
The program concentrated on controlling Southern Pine Beetle 
infestations in state and privately-owned lands as well as adjacent wilderness 
areas. The wilderness areas included Caney Creek Wilderness, Ouachita 
National Forest, Arkansas; Kisatchie Hills Wilderness Area, Kisatchie National 
Forest, Louisiana; Black Creek Wilderness Area and Leaf Wilderness Area, De 
Soto National Forest, Mississippi.
Following the plaintiffs original complaints, the court preliminarily 
enjoined the program  in wilderness areas, except for selective cutting around 
woodpecker colonies, to benefit the woodpeckers, until the Forest Service 
completed an environmental impact statement (EIS). Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. 
Supp. 488 (D. D.C. 1985). The plaintiffs raised three concerns over the program. 
First, they claimed that the program required an Environmental Impact
74
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Statement (EIS) according to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEFA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982), before it could be implemented. Second, they argued 
that the program violated the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 
(1982), by possibly causing harm  to the endangered Red Cockaded Woodpecker. 
Lastly, the plaintiffs claimed that the program, requiring tree-cutting and 
chemical-spraying in wilderness areas, violated Section 2 of the Wilderness Act.
16 u  s  e .  §§ 1131-1136 (1982).
The Forest Service completed the EIS process on March 6,1987, and the 
Secretary delivered a Record of Decision on April 6,1987. After the EIS was 
completed, the plaintiffs' complaints were heard.
The NEPA claim was settled as the Forest Service completed an EIS. The 
ESA claim was declared moot. The parties agreed the issue was moot as the 
plaintiffs could not show that the Forest Service's program constituted a "taking" 
under the ESA. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532(19). The only claim to be heard was the 
Wilderness Act claim.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
The Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs contended that the Secretary's actions in implementing the 
Southern Pine Beetle infestation control plan were unjustified under the 
appropriate language of the Wilderness Act. The plaintiffs moved for summary 
judgment.
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Defendants' Identities and Contentions
Richard E. Lyng, Secretary of Agriculture, et al., defendants.
The defendants contended that the Secretary's actions were reasonable 
and w ithin his discretion. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
Case Issues
(1) What statute governed the Secretary's actions?
(2) How did the court interpret Section 4(d)(1) of the Wilderness Act 
related to the question of whether cutting along the borders of wilderness areas 
was "necessary"?
(3) Were the Secretary's actions reasonable?
(4) Under the beetle control program, would federally-designated 
wilderness areas be sacrificed for private interests?
Court's Holdings
On what statute governed the Secretarv's actions: The court and both 
parties agreed that the Secretary's actions were governed by Section 4(d)(1) of the 
Wilderness Act. The section allows the Secretary to take "such measures [within 
Wilderness Areas] . . .a s  may be necessary in control of fire, insects, and diseases, 
subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems desirable." 16 U.S.C. § 
1123(d)(1) (1982).
On the court's interpretation of Section 4fd)fiys "necessary" wording: In 
Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1987), the court held that under the 
Wilderness Act, the Secretary had "art affirmative burden of justifying his actions
Insect Control Program
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'by demonstrating they are necessary to effectively control the threatened harm 
that prom pts the action being taken/" 663 F. Supp. at 558-59 quoting 662 F. Supp. 
40.
The plaintiffs interpreted "necessary" to mean that the Secretary needed 
scientific proof that the cutting was necessary before the program could be 
implemented.
The court found that the plaintiffs had interpreted "necessary" too 
narrowly. Specifically, the court held that "necessary" should be read as the 
means "needed to achieve a certain result or effect," a definition according to the 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 877 (1981). The court 
concluded that:
[t]he pertinent section of the statute is therefore most reasonably 
construed as allowing the Secretary to use measures that fall short 
of full effectiveness so long as they are reasonably designed to 
restrain or limit the threatened spread of beetle infestations from 
wilderness land into the neighboring property, to its detriment.
663 F. Supp. at 556.
On whether the Secretary's actions were reasonable: The court held that 
the Secretary's actions were reasonable pursuant to Section 10 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1982).
Reviewing Forest Service records on beetle infestation control and 
relevant scientific opinion, the court found that the Secretary's decisions were 
reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious.
Insect Control Program
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On whether wilderness areas would be sacrificed for private land 
interests: The court held that wilderness areas would not be sacrificed for 
private land interests. Rather, the court found that the Secretary had properly 
explained that private landowners would exert the same amount of effort as the 
Forest Service to control beetle infestation. That said, the court found that the 
Secretary had met his obligations under the Wilderness Act.
Result
The court granted the defendants summary judgment on the Wilderness 
Act claims. The plaintiffs motion for summary judgment was denied. The ESA 
claim was moot. The NEPA claim was dismissed.
Other Cases Referenced
Earlier Litigation—Sierra Club v. Block, 614 F. Supp. 488 (D.D.C. 1985); 
Sierra Club v. Lyng, 622 F. Supp. 40,42 (D.D.C. 1987).
"Necessary" interpretation—Sierra Club v. Lyng, supra; Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421,4 L.Ed. 579.
Insect Control Program
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United States v. Gregg 
290 F.Supp. 706 (W.D. Wash. 1968)
Background
The defendant was convicted by the United States for landing an airplane 
in a federally-designated wilderness area. This case was presented before the 
court on the appeal by the defendant.
Plaintiffs Identity and Contentions
The United States of America, plaintiff.
The United States contended that the defendant was lawfully and 
properly convicted.
Defendant's Identity and Contentions
Vean R. Gregg, defendant.
The defendant claimed that he was unlawfully convicted for landing an 
airplane in a National Forest Wilderness. He claimed that the Wilderness Act 
permitted airplane landings where there was established use. He argued that 
landings could continue unless the Secretary of Agriculture banned them and 
furthermore, that the Secretary did not have the power to prohibit landings 
altogether. Finally, Gregg argued that the United States could not treat his 
landing as a criminal violation as no penalty for wilderness landings was written 
inlaw .
79
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Case Issues
(1) Are aircrafts allowed in national wilderness areas?
(2) Would an illegal aircraft landing constitute a criminal violation in a 
national wilderness area?
Court's Holdings
On whether aircrafts are allowed in national wilderness areas: The court
held that aircraft landings were outlawed in national wilderness areas according
to the Wilderness Act of 1964 and a federal regulation promulgated by the
Secretary of Agriculture. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), (d)(1). 36 CFR 251.75,16 U.S.C. §
551. Section 1133(c) states,
except as necessaiy to meet minimum requirements for the 
administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter (including 
measures required in emergencies involving the health and safety 
of persons within the area), there shall be ... no landing of aircraft 
... w ithin any such area."
Section 1133(d)(1) states that aircraft landings may be permitted in areas where 
there has been an established use. The court stressed the use of the word "may" 
rather than "shall" in the section.
After the passage of the W üdemess Act of 1964, aircraft landings 
continued in areas where previous use was established. However, aircraft 
landings, except where permitted in the Wilderness Act, were banned in a 
regulation declared by the Secretary of Agriculture. 36 CFR 251.75,16 U.S.C. §
Airplanes in Wilderness
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551. In the regulation, the Secretary granted the Chief of the Forest Service the 
power to condone landings in cases of need where prior use was established. 
According to these aspects of the Wilderness Act and Code of Federal 
Regulations, the court held that aircraft landings were not permitted in 
wilderness areas unless specifically allowed by the Secretary of Agriculture or 
Chief of the Forest Service.
On whether an illegal aircraft landing would constitute a criminal 
violation: The court held that an illegal aircraft landing in a national wilderness 
area did constitute a criminal violation according to 16 U.S.C. § 551 and the 
earlier case law in McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9* Cir. 1965). Section 
551 states.
The Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for the 
protection against destruction by fire and depredations upon the ... 
national forests ... and he may make such rules and regulations .., 
as will insure the objects of such reservations, namely to regulate 
their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from 
destruction; and any violation o f ... such rules and regulations shall 
be punished by a fine of not more that $500 or imprisonment for 
not more than six months, or both.
The court in McMichael v. United States relied on section 551 to uphold a
conviction in that case in which the plaintiffs used motorized vehicles in a
primitive area before the Wilderness Act had been passed. In the present case,
the court decided that section 551 designated infractions of the Wilderness Act as
criminal acts. The Wilderness Act prohibited the plaintiff's landing. Therefore,
the action was criminal according to section 551.
Airplanes in Wilderness
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Result
The court confirmed the United States Commissioner's decision that the 
aircraft landing was a criminal act. The court found that the plaintiff's appeal 
was groundless.
Other Cases Referenced
16 U.S.C. S 551—McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9‘h Cir. 1965).
Airplanes in Wilderness
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Izaak Walton League o f America v. St. Clair 
497 F. 2d 849 (8«» Cir. 1974)
Case History
55 F.R.D. 139 (1972)—judgment affirmed by 497 F. 2d 849 (1974)—cerf, denied 
fy419U.S. 1009(1974).
Background
This case focused on the mining rights of defendant, George W. St. Clair, 
in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area. In 1969, St. Clair conducted exploratory 
work in the 150,000 acres of land in which his mining rights lie and determined 
that drilling would be appropriate in the area. St. Clair did not have a permit to 
conduct the drilling. He alerted the Forest Service of his plan to drill that in turn 
notified him that it was not in favor of the proposed drilling. Throughout the 
litigation the Forest Service had not completed the administrative permit process 
for St. Clair.
The Boundary Waters Canoe Area is part of the Superior National Forest 
in northern Minnesota. The Superior National Forest (3,000,000 acres) was 
protected as a national forest in 1909 by President Theodore Roosevelt. The land 
comprising the present day Boundary Waters Canoe Area (1,031,204 acres) was 
included in the forest's designation. As part of the designation. President 
Roosevelt found "at least inferentially that the Superior National Forest was 
more valuable for forest than for mineral." 353 F. Supp. at 703. The Secretary of
83
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Agriculture established the first roadless area in the Superior National Forest in 
1927. After a number of roadless areas were designated, a regulation was passed 
combining them into the Boundary Waters Canoe Area (BWCA) on January 27, 
1958.
The national Wilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C.A. § 1131 et seq., established 
the BWCA as part of the National Wilderness Preservation System. The 
Wilderness Act allowed mineral activity for existing rights so long as the 
exploration is compatible w ith the wilderness character of the area. Similarly, 
mineral extraction was perm itted until December 31,1983 so long as the means 
of extraction were deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Agriculture. 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1133(d)(2) and (3).
The Secretary of Agriculture appointed a BWCA Review Committee in 
1964 that made recommendations regarding mining activity in the BWCA. The 
committee recommended that mining not be allowed and that permission 
granting mining permits ought to be revoked. 353 F. Supp. at 706. The Secretary 
responded with a report saying that "consent of the Department of Agriculture 
not be given for mining and mineral leasing in the Boundary Waters Ccinoe Area, 
except in a national emergency ..."  353 F. Supp. at 706.
Plaintiff's Identity and Contention
Izaak Walton League of America, plaintiff.
The plaintiffs argued that mining was banned by the Wilderness Act. In 
the appeal, the plaintiffs supported the decision of the District Court.
Mining Claim Rights
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D efendant's Identity and Contention
George W. St. Clair, a citizen holding mineral rights to 150,000 acres in the 
Boundary Waters Canoe Area, appellant.
The appellant argued that mining was permitted in the BWCA according 
to federal laws and that the district court erred in its granting of an injunction 
against him. Furthermore, St. Clair argued that the district court's decision 
constituted a taking of his private property rights.
Robert L. Herbst, Commissioner of Conservation of the State of 
Minnesota, appellant.
Herbst, a representative for the state of Minnesota argued that the state 
had standing and could make cross-claims in the suit although it was denied by 
the district court.
Earl L. Butz, Secretary of Agriculture, et al., appellants.
Butz represented the federal interests in the case. The federal appellants 
argued that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should have been applied to the 
present case. It disagreed w ith the district court that mining was disallowed by 
the Wilderness Act and claimed that some compatible mining was permitted. 
Case Issues
(1) Could the court rule on the plaintiff's claims?
(2) Did the district court err in its decision?
Mining Claim Rights
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Court's Holdings
On whether the court could rule on the plaintiff's claims: The court of 
appeals held that it could not rule on the plaintiffs claims. The case at hand 
involved a legal question (did the Wilderness Act bar the defendant from 
mining?) while enforcement of the decision required resolution of the issues at 
hand by the administrative process (would the Forest Service grant St. Clair a 
permit?).
The court held that the Forest Service had to grant a final decision on St. 
Clair's permit to driU in the BWCA before the court could proceed with the 
decision.
On whether the district court erred in its decision: The court of appeals 
found that the district court erred in its earlier decision. The court reversed the 
district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions that the Forest 
Service needed to complete its permit review before the case was subject to 
judicial review.
Result
The case was reversed and remanded with instructions that the Forest 
Service complete permit process before the case was subjected to judicial review. 
O ther Cases Referenced
Establishment of Roadless Areas— United States v. Perko, 108 F. Supp. 315, 
316 (D.Minn.l952), aff'd Perko v. United States, 204 F. 2d 446 (8* Cir. 1953), cert, 
denied 346 U.S. 832, 74 S. Ct. 48,49,98 L.Ed. 355 (1953); see companion cases of
Mining Claim Rights
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United States v. Perko, 8 Cir., 133 F. Supp. 564 (D.Minn.l955); 141 F. Supp. 372 
(D.Minn.l956); Bydlon v. United States, 146 Ct.Cl. 764,175 F. Supp. 891 (1959).
Zoning—Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,36 S. Ct. 143,60 L.Ed. 348 
(1915); St. Paul v. Chicago, St. Paul, Mpls. and Omaha Ry., 413 F. 2d 762 (8* 
Cir.1969); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,593,82 S. Ct. 987,8 L.Ed.
2d 130 (1962); City of Marysville v. Standard Cil Co., 27 F. 2d 478 (8*̂  Cir.1928), 
aff'd. Standard OU Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582,49 S. Ct. 430, 73 L.Ed. 856 (1929); 
Kiges V. City of St. Paul, 240 Minn. 522,62 N.W. 2d 363,369-70 (1953); State ex rel. 
Beery v. Houghton, 164 Minn. 146,204 N.W. 569,54 A.L.R. 1012 (1925), aff'd mem., 
273 U.S. 671,47 S. Ct. 474,71 L.Ed. 832 (1927), Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365,395,47 S. Ct. 114,121,71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 
608-609,47 S. Ct. 675,71 L.Ed. 1228 (1927); McMahon v. City of Dubuque, Iowa, 255 
F. 2d 154,158-159 (8*̂  Cir.), cert, denied, 358 U.S. 833,79 S. Ct. 53,3 L.Ed. 2d 70 
(1958); Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492,162 N.W. 
2d 206,212 (1968); State ex rel. Howard v. Village of Roseville, 244 Minn. 343,70 
N.W. 2d 404,407 (1955); South Carolina State H. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177,191-192,58 S. Ct. 510,82 L.Ed. 734 (1938); Weinberg v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 
150 F. 2d 645,648 (8* Cir. 1945); Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v. Village of Minnetonka, 
[281 Minn. 492] 162 N.W. 2d at 209; American Wood Products Co. v. City of 
Minneapolis, 21 F. 2d 440,444 (D.Minn.l927) Q. Sanborn), aff'd, 35 F. 2d 657 (8“» 
Cir.1929); Kiges v. City of St. Paul, [240 Minn. 522,] 62 N.W. 2d at 369; Berman v. 
Parker, 348 U.S. 26,75 S. Ct. 98,99 L.Ed. 27 (1954); Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. v.
Mining Claim Rights
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Village of Minnetonka, supra. State ex rel Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 
Minn. 1 ,174 N.W. 885,176 N.W. 159,162,8 A.L.R. 585 (1920); United States v. 
Gregg, 290 F. Supp. 706 (W.D.Wash.l968); McMichael v. United States, 355 F. 2d 
283 (9‘h Cir.1965); United States v. Foresyth, 321 F. Supp. 761 (D.Colo.l971); West 
Virginia Highlands Conserv. v. Island Greek Coal Co., 441 F. 2d 232 {4*>̂ Cir.1971).
Abandonment, Laches, Equities— Washburn v. Gregory Co., 125 Minn. 491, 
147 N.W. 706 (1914); Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88,83 N.W. 2d 800 (1957); 
Klass V. Twin City Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 291 Minn. 68,190 N.W. 2d 493 
(1971); Heywood v. Northern Assurance Co., 133 Minn. 360,158 N.W. 632 (1916).
Mining Claim Rights
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Otter Creek Coal Company v. United States 
231 Ct.Cl. 878 (1982)
Background
The plaintiff owned mining rights to an area within the Otter Creek 
Wilderness Area of the National Wilderness Preservation System. 16 U.S.C. § 
1131 et seq. The defendant owned the surface rights above the area in question. 
Earlier in the litigation, the court determined that the plaintiff had to be denied a 
permit application before the court could enter a final decision. The plaintiff 
applied to the Secretary of Interior through the Office of Surface Mining & 
Reclamation (OSM) and the Secretary of Agriculture through the Forest Service 
(USFS).
The court described this situation as a role reversal. The government did 
not w ant to deny the permit as it might constitute a taking which was 
discouraged by the legislative history of the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. The government 
claimed the plaintiff was unwilling to cooperate with the government's 
guidelines. For example, the government encouraged the plaintiff to pursue a 
declaration of "valid existing rights" so that it's mining claim could be granted 
under the SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).
In the two earlier court reports the court decided that no decision could be 
made until the government made a final decision on the plaintiff's application.
Mining Claim Rights
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
90
However, after the plaintiff applied to the Secretaries, the Secretaries halted the 
decision process as the application would have been denied.
Plaintiff's Identity and Contention
Otter Creek Coal Company, plaintiff.
The plaintiff pursued this suit arguing that the designation of the 
wilderness area constituted a legislative taking of its mining claim. It claimed 
that the Wilderness Act of 1964, Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 
1977, and the Eastern Wilderness Act of 1975 prohibited mining and that it 
should be reimbursed for the legislative taking. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.) 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 1201 et seq.; Pub. L. No. 93-622,99 Stat. 2096.
Defendant's Identity and Contention
United States of America, defendant.
The United States, under the direction of the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977, wanted to avoid a taking claim in this situation. 30 
U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq.
Case Issues
(1) Could Otter Creek Coal Company mine in the Otter Creek Wilderness
Area?
(2) Could Otter Creek Coal Company use the "valid existing rights" claim 
under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977?
Mining Claim Rights
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Court's Holdings
On whether Otter Creek Coal Company could mine in the Otter Creek 
Wilderness Area: The court held that if the government could design a plan to 
mine in the Otter Creek Wilderness Area which met all regulations, the Otter 
Creek Coal Company could coal mine in the wilderness.
On whether Otter Creek Coal Company could claim "valid existing 
rights" under SMCRA: The court held that Otter Creek could pursue "valid 
existing rights" as the definition of "valid existing rights" was vague.
The plaintiff argued that it could not pursue "valid existing rights" because it did 
not pass the "all permits" test which was part of the regulation adopted in 1979. 
The court disagreed because the regulations had become more permissive as a 
means to avoid takings. Therefore, the plaintiff could and should pursue its 
"valid existing rights."
Result
The court affirmed the trial judge's order that encouraged the plaintiff and 
defendant to determine whether an agreement for coal mining could be reached 
m the Otter Creek Wilderness Area.
O ther Cases Referenced
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act—Model v. Virginia Surface 
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,295-97 (1981); Model v. Indian, 452 U.S. 
314,333-35 (1981); Agins v. City ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255,260-63 (1980); Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Mining Claim Rights
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"Valid Existing Rights"—Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 
Civ. No. 79-1144 (D.D.C. Feb. 26,1980), aff'd 653 F. 2d 514, cert, denied; Peabody 
Coal Co. V. Watt, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
Mining Claim Rights
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Pacific Legal Foundation v. W a tt 
529 F. Supp. 982 (D.Mont. 1981)
Case History
529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981)— supplemented by 539 F. Supp. 1194 (D. 
Mont. 1982)
Background
The w üdemess areas at issue included the Bob Marshall, Scapegoat and 
Great Bear Wilderness that were designated as part of the National Wilderness 
Preservation System under the national Wilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 
et seq. (1976). The case concerned mineral activity in the wilderness areas. 
Mining was addressed in the Wilderness Act that stated that mining could 
continue until midnight December 13,1983, after which mining exploration and 
leasing would cease completely.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) includes 
a provision for emergency public land withdraws to be used by the Secretary of 
Interior. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq. Section 204(e) allows the Secretary to 
withdraw  public lands from mineral activity if either the Committee on Interior 
and Insular Affairs of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources of the Senate apprises the Secretary that an emergency 
situation exists for the public lands.
The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs voted 23 to 18 on 
May 21,1981, for a resolution stating that an emergency situation existed in the
93
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Bob M arshall Scapegoat and Great Bear Wilderness Areas. The resolution found 
that "'extraordinary measures' must be taken 'to preserve values that otherwise 
would be lost.'" 529 F. Supp. at 986. As a result, the Committee chairman 
directed the Secretary of Interior to withdrawal lands in the Bob Marshall, 
Scapegoat, and Great Bear Wilderness Areas from mining exploration and 
leasing until Jan. 1,1984.
The Secretary w ithdrew  the lands under Public Land Order No. 5952 on 
June 1,1981.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF), et al., plaintiffs.
Mountain States Legal Foundation, plaintiff.
Pacific Legal Foundation and Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) 
brought this suit against the Secretary of the United States Department of the 
Interior, James Watt, to dispute the withdrawal of certain wilderness lands from 
mineral activity. The plaintiffs included eight individuals who are members of 
the MSLF and six individuals who support PLF. All individuals held lease 
applications to wilderness lands within the areas withdrawn under Public Land 
Order No. 5952.
Plaintiffs argued that (1) the House instructions to withdraw lands under 
§ 204(e) violated that Secretary of Agriculture's discretionary control of 
determining scope and duration of the withdrawal, and (2) the House directive
Emergency Land Withdrawals
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conflicted with § 4(d)(3) of the Wilderness Act which permitted mineral
exploration and leasing activities until Jan. 1 ,1984.
D efendants' Identities and Contentions
James G. Watt, Secretary of the United States Department of Interior, John
R. Block, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, defendants.
The Bob Marshall Alliance, the Wilderness Society, and the Sierra Club,
intervening-defendants.
The federal defendants contended that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
sue, but wrote that,
if plaintiffs have standing to sue, the Committee had no statutory 
authority to direct the Secretary to withdraw the wilderness areas 
and the Secretary had no authority to withdraw the lands; and ... 
that portion of section 204(e) w hid i authorized Committee's 
emergency withdrawal resolution is unconstitutional for essentially 
the same reasons urged by the plaintiffs. 529 F. Supp. at 987.
Case Issues
(1) Did the House directive "impermissibly conflict" with the National 
Wilderness Act of 1964?
(2) May a Congressional Committee establish the scope and duration of a 
"withdrawal" under Section 204(e) of FLPMA of wilderness lands from mineral 
and gas leasing?
Court's Holdings
On the conflict between the House directive and the Wilderness Act: The 
court held that the House's resolution did conflict with the Wilderness Act. The
Emergency Land W ithdrawals
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resolution prohibited mineral exploration and leasing activities until Jan. 1,1984 
whereas the Wilderness Act permitted mineral exploration and leasing activities 
until Jan. 1,1984. 16 U.S.C.A. § 4(d)(3).
On Section 204(e) of FLPMA: The court found that the House Committee 
did not have the power to direct the Secretary to remove public lands under the 
Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) section 204e. Rather, 
section 204(e) permitted the House Committee to recommend a withdrawal of 
public land in the case of an emergency situation, but the Secretary must 
determine the scope and duration of the withdrawal, subject to judicial review. 
Finally, the Court found that the Secretary had the power to cancel the order to 
withdrawal lands (after a reasonable am ount of time) made by the House or 
Senate Committees on natural resources.
Result
The court ordered the Secretary to revoke Public Land Order No. 5952 and 
to determine the scope and duration of the public land withdrawal within the 
three wilderness areas. The Secretary had, after the original review of the issue 
and before this opinion, deferred all gas and oil drilling in all wilderness areas. 
Other Cases Referenced
Standing (Iniurvl— Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
Inc., 438 U.S. 59,79,98 S. Ct. 2620,2633,57 L.Ed. 2d 595 (1978); Chadha v. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F. 2d 408.415 (9 Cir. 1980), cert, granted, 
—  U.S. —, 102 S. Ct. 87,70 L.Ed. 2d 80 (1981).
Emergency Land Withdrawals
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Standing (sufficient concrete interests)—Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 ,12 n. 
10,96 S. Ct. 612,631 n.lO, 46 L.Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam).
Standingl'personal stake)—Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498-99,95 S. Ct. 
2197,2205,45 L.Ed. 2d 343 (1975).
Standing. "Injured in fact, zone of interests"—United States v. SCRAP, 412 
U.S. 669,686,93 S. Ct. 2405, 2415,37 L.Ed. 2d 254 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 
U.S. 727,733,92 S. Ct. 1361,1365,31 L.Ed. 2d 636 (1972).
Standing related to noncompetitive leases—Burglin v. Morton, 527 F. 2d 
486,488 n.2 (9 Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 425 U.S. 973,96 S. Ct. 2171,48 L.Ed. 2d 796 
(1976). Arnold v. Morton, 529 F. 2d 1101,1106 (9 Cir. 1976). Schraier v. Hickel, 419 
F. 2d 663,667 (D C. Cir. 1969)
. Standing to challenge unlawful impediments—Krueger v. Morton, 539 F. 2d 
235 (D.C.Cir. 1976); Duesing v. Udall, 350 F. 2d 748 (D.C.Cir. 1965), cert, denied', 383 
U.S. 912,86 S. Ct. 888,15 L.Ed. 2d 667 (1966).
"Generalized grievance"—Wart/i v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499,95 S. Ct. at 2205; 
Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 80,98 S. Ct. 2634; Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to 
Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 220,94 S. Ct. 2925,2931,41 L.Ed. 2d 706 (1974); Sierra 
Club V. Morton, 405 U.S. at 735,92 S. Ct. at 1366; Western Mining Council v. Watt, 
643 F. 2d 618,623 (9 Cir. 1981), petition for cert, denied —U.S. —, 102 S. Ct. 567,70 
L.Ed. 2d 474 (1981); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252,264,97 S. Ct. 555,563,50 L.Ed. 2d 450 (1977).
Emergency Land Withdrawals
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Standing of organizations—Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. at 739,92 S. Ct. 
at 1368; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 511,95 S. Ct. at 2211; Hunt v. Washington State 
Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333,97 S. Ct. 2434,53 L.Ed. 2d 383 (1977); 
Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, 608 F. 2d 1319 (9 Cir. 1979), cert, 
denied, 447 U.S. 921,100 S. Ct. 3010,65 L.Ed. 2d 1112 (1980); Coles v. Havens Realty 
Corp., 633 F. 2d 384 (4 Cir. 1980).
Ripeness—Myers v. Bethlehem Corp., 303 U.S. 41,50-51,58 S. Ct. 459,463,82 
L.Ed. 638 (1938); United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry., 265 U.S. 274,282,44 S.
Ct. 565,567,68 L.Ed. 1016 (1924); Kale v. United States, 489 P. 2d 449,454 (9* Cir. 
1973), cert, denied, 417 U.S. 915,94 S. Ct. 2617,41 L.Ed. 2d 220 (1974); Parisi v. 
Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,37,92 S. Ct. 815,818,31 L.Ed. 2d 17 (1972); Pence v. Kleppe, 
529 F. 2d 135,143 (9 Cir. 1976).
Constitutionality—New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 
582,99 S. Ct. 1355,1364,59 L.Ed. 2d 587 (1979). Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. 
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,105,65 S. Ct. 152,154,89 L.Ed. 101 (1944).
W ithdrawal under mineral leasing laws—Udall v. Tollman, 380 U.S. 1,85 S. 
Ct. 792,13 L.Ed. 2d 616 (1965). Mecham v. Udall, 369 F. 2d 1 (10 Cir. 1966). 
Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D.Wyo. 1980).
Secretary's power to revoke order—State of Alaska v. Carter, 462 F. Supp. 
1155,1157 (D.Alaska, 1978).
Duration established bv committee—Chadha v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 634 F. 2d 408.
Emergency Land Withdrawals
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Sierra Club v. Yeutter 
911 F. 2d 1405 <10* Cir. 1990)
Case History
615 F. Supp. 44 (1985)—remanded with directions for federal defendants to 
complete a "memorandum explaining their analysis, final decision, and plan to comply 
with their statutory obligations..." by 622 F, Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985)—defendants' 
appeal denied due to lack of finality by Sierra Club v. Lyng, Nos. 86-1153,86-1154 & 
86-1155 (10* Cir. 1986)—holding that federal water rights exist in Colorado wilderness 
areas affirmed by Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 19S7)—final 
judgment declared by Sierra Club v. Lyng, No. 84-M-2 (D. Colo. 1988)—vacated and 
remanded with directions by present case.
Background
This case focused on whether federal reserved water rights existed in 
Colorado wilderness areas. The Colorado wilderness areas in question were part 
of the National Wilderness Preservation System, which was created by the 
National Wilderness Act of 1964. 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.
The defendants and intervenors appealed the final decision of the District 
Court of Colorado which stated that federal reserved water rights existed in 
federally-designated Colorado wilderness areas. Sierra Club v. Lyng, No. 84-M-2 
(D.Colo. Sept. 30,1988).
99 ■
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The court of appeals ruled that the management of federally reserved 
water rights should be left to agency discretion. In its decision, the court 
overturned the district court's decision and created a non-binding precedent. 
Result
The appeal was dismissed. The judgment of the district court granting 
declaratory judgment that federal reserved water rights were created by the 
Wilderness Act was vacated. The case was remanded "with directions to dismiss 
the complaint as not ripe for adjudication." 911 F. 2d 1405.
Other Cases Referenced
Nonassertion of reserved water rights—Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821,105 
S. Ct. 1649,84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985).
Doctrine of separation of powers—Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 
424 F. Supp. 172,175 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
Determining the proper method of analysis—Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,87 S. Ct. 1507,18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967); Toilet Goods 
Association v. Gardner (Toilet Goods I), 387 U.S. 158,87 S. Ct. 167,87 S. Ct. 1526,18 
L. Ed. 2d 704 (1967).
Agency action reviewability—Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. 402,91 S. Ct. 814,28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 402,105 
S. Ct. 1649,84 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1985); Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560,95 S. Ct.
1851,44 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1975); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592,108 S. Ct. 2047,100 L. 
Ed. 2d 632 (1988).
Federal Reserved Water Rights
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Application of reviewability standard—Adams v. Richardson, 480 F. 2d 
1159,1162 (D C. Cir. 1973) (en banc); Kola, Inc. v. United States, 882 F. 2d 361,363- 
64 (9‘h Cir. 1989); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,15,92 S. Ct. 2318,2326,33 L. Ed. 2d 
154 (1971).
Was the issue ripe for decision—Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136,87 S. Ct. 1507,18 L. Ed. 2d 681 (1967); Toilet Goods 1, 387 U.S. 158,87 S. Ct. 
1520,18 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1967); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources 
Conservation & Development Commission, 461 U. S. 190,103 S. Ct. 1713,75 L. Ed. 2d 
752 (1983); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696,698,98 S. Ct. 3012,3013,57 
L. Ed. 2d 1052 (1978) (scope of federal reserved water rights turn on 
congressional intent); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128,138,96 S. Ct. 2062, 
2069,48 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1976) (reserved water rights can arise by implication from 
reservations of land); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449 U.S. 232,239-40,101 S. Ct. 488, 
493,6 6  L. Ed. 2d 416 (1980); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 496 U.S. —, 110 S. 
Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,89 S. Ct. 
1657,1663,23 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1969); U.S. v. Bell, 724 P. 2d 631,641-42 (Colo. 1986) 
(en banc); United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P. 2d 1,34-35 (Colo. 1983) 
(en banc); Navajo Development Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P. 2d 1374,1379 (Colo. 1982) 
(en banc).
Determining jurisdiction—Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F,
2d 1134,1137 (5th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 451 U.S. 1008,101 S. Ct. 2345,68 L. Ed. 2d 
861 (1981); Sherman v. American Fed'n of Musicians, 588 F. 2d 1313,1314 (10* Cir.
Federal Reserved Water Rights
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1978), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 825,100 S. Ct. 46,62 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1979); Northern Ind. 
Pub. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 782 F. 2d 730, 746 (7* Cir. 1986); Environmental Defense 
Fund V. Ruckelshaus, 439 F. 2d 584,596 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Federal Reserved Water Rights
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Wright V. United States 
868 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Tenn. 1994)
Case History
Affirmed without opinion by 82 F. 3d 419 (6“» Cir. 1996).
Background
The Joyce Kilmer-Slickrock Wilderness (Slickrock) is part of the Nantahala 
National Forest in western North Carolina. Slickrock was designated as 
wilderness in 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-622, § 3(a)(7), 88 Stat. 2097 Qan. 3,1975). The 
plaintiffs were hiking on Slickrock Creek Trail in the Slickrock Wilderness on 
April 11,1991, when a rotting tree fell across the trail on which they were hiking. 
Ms. Wright claimed she was knocked unconscious and injured her left leg which 
required subsequent am putation above the knee. Ms. Acuff claimed she was 
knocked unconscious as well and received injuries to both legs, suffered broken 
ribs, and various cuts.
Plaintiffs' Identities and Contentions
Gladys Wright and her husband, Henry L. Wright, and Christine Acuff.
Plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the United States under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674, for the injuries they 
received from the falling tree (including loss of consortium for Mr. Wright). The 
plaintiffs argued negligence because (1) the trail was not appropriately inspected;
(2) the rotting tree was not removed before it fell on the trail; (3) there were no
103
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signs posted warning of the danger of falling trees; and (4) the plaintiffs were 
permitted to hike on the trail. The plaintiffs amended their original complaint by 
including that the defendants violated the Forest Service's Land and Resource 
Management Plan.
Defendant's Identity and Contentions
United States of America, defendant.
Defendant argued that (1) "the discretionary function of the FTCA 
prohibits judicial review of United States' policies and decisions regarding 
vdldemess management; (2) the N orth Carolina Trails and Hikers Act bars the 
action; and (3) the United States did not owe plaintiffs a duty under North 
Carolina law." 868 F. Supp. at 931.
Case Issue
Did the Forest Service's failure to cut down rotting tree in wilderness fall 
within "the discretionary function exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act 
(FTCA) waiver of sovereign immunity?"
Court's Holding
On whether the Forest Service's decision not to cut down rotting tree in 
wilderness fell within "the discretionary function exception" to the liability of the 
federal government: The court held that the Forest Service's decision fell within 
the discretionary function exception to liability of the federal government. 
Because the decision was within the discretionary function exception, the court 
lacked jurisdiction.
Trail Maintenance
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The United States Is immune from being sued for tort claims because of its
sovereign status except where a "clear relinquishment" of immunity is present.
The Federal Torts Claim Act generally waives the sovereign immunity of the
United States in cases where the suit filed is "for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of
any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment." 28 U.S.C. § 1345(b). The FTCA contains a number of exceptions
to this general waiver of immunity. The discretionary function exception
exempts the United States from liability for
any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the 
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or 
based upon the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the federal 
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
The Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether the
government's actions fall w ithin the discretionary function exception. United
States V. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-324, 111 S. Ct. at 1274. A court must first decide
whether the alleged act or failure to act violated a "mandatory regulation or
policy that allowed no judgment or choice." 868 F. Supp. at 932. If the
government employee was required to act in a prescribed manner without
exercising judgment, the discretionary function exception does not apply, and
the court has jurisdiction. If the employee is entitled to exercise discretion,
however, the court must reach the second part of the test, and determine whether
Trail Maintenance
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that judgment is of the kind "that the discretionary function exception was
designed to shield." 868 F. Supp. at 932, quoting Berkowitz v. United States, 486
U.S. 531,536 (1988).
In applying the two-part test here, the district court focused on the
manual promulgated by the Forest Service, the Land émd Resource Management
Plan 1986-2000, Nantahala and Pisgah National Forest (Management Plan or
Plan). The parties agreed that, pursuant to the Plan, the Slickrock Creek Trail
was to maintained at Level 1 or 2. Referring to maintenance requirements, the
Management Plan states:
Removal of tree that could fall across the trail. Fell only trees likely 
to fall on or across the trail. Fell away from trail. Remove any slash 
from corridor. No hazard tree removal in wilderness. FREQUENCY:
2 years or less, depending on timber type. Management Plan Table 
G-5, p. G-9. (emphasis added).
The parties disagreed about the effect of this provision. The government argued
that because the Slickrock Creek Trail is in a designated wilderness area, the Plan
forbade the Forest Service from felling any trees because there is to be "[n]o
hazard tree removal in wilderness." Plaintiffs argued that that phrase does not
apply to trails m the wilderness, which are governed by the first part of the
quotation from the Plan, i.e., "[f]ell only trees likely to fall on or across the trail."
See 868 F. Supp. at 935.
Rather than resolving this issue, the court assumed arguendo that the
provision of the Plan that stated that no trees were to be felled in the wilderness
did not apply to trees near trails. 868 F. Supp. at 9351 The court then concluded
Trail Maintenance
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that the provision, "[f]ell only trees likely to fall on or across the trail," was not 
m andatory and did not require the Forest Service to remove all trees that might 
fall across trails, but merely specified those trees which may be removed. It 
concluded that the guidelines for trail maintenance allowed Forest Service 
employees maximum discretion. 868 F. Supp. at 936.
Having concluded that the government met the first part of the Gaubert 
test in that the act was discretionary, the court then proceeded to the second part 
of the test, i.e., whether the discretionary function exception was designed to 
shield this type of judgment. 868 F. Supp. at 936. It concluded that "Plaintiffs' 
allegations regarding the Forest Service's hazardous tree inspection and removal 
procedures, and the decisions on how to comply with those inspections and 
procedures, are clearly within the scope of the discretionary function exception." 
868 F. Supp. at 936.
The court did not address the state law issues raised by the United States.
Result
The court found that plaintiff's "claims are barred by the discretionary 
function exception to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C.A. §2680 (a)" and awarded the 
defendant's motion for dismissal. 868 F. Supp. at 937.
O ther Cases Referenced
United States sovereignty— United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584,586,61 
S. Ct. 767,769-770,85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941).
Trail Maintenance
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"Clear relinquishment" of sovereign im m unity— Dalehite v. United States, 
346 U.S. 15,31,73 S. Ct. 956,965,97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953).
Federal Tort Claims Act—United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807,813,96 S. 
Ct. 1971,1975,48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976); Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F. 3d 594,596 
(6* Cir. 1994); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586-87,61 S. Ct. at 769-70; United States v. 
Kubrick, 444 U.S. I l l ,  100 S. Ct. 352,62 L.Ed.2d 259 (1986); United States v. SA . 
Empressa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797,808,104 S. Ct. 
2755,2762,81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984).
Two part test—discretionary function exception—United States v. Gaubert, 
499 U.S. 315,322-24, 111 S. Ct. 1267,1273-74,113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991); Berkovitz v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 531,536,108 S. Ct. 1954,1958,100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988); Varig 
Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813,104 S. Ct. at 2765, Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36,73 S. Ct. at 968; 
Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324, 111 S. Ct. at 1274.
FTCA §2680 fa) application even if there is negligence—Dalehite, 346 U.S. 
at 32,73 S. Ct. at 966, Id. at 33,73 S. Ct. at 966, Autery v. United States, 992 F. 2d 
1523 (ll*h Cir. 1993); Zumwalt v. United States, 928 F. 2d 951 (10»̂  Cir. 1991); Baum 
V. United States, 986 F. 2d 716 (4*̂  Cir. 1993).
Trail Maintenance
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
Appendix A
Statutes in Wilderness Case Law
Wilderness Act of 1964,16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1131 et seq.
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C .§ 706
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,30 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq.
Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346
National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 et seq.
Aléiska National Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq.
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.
Regulations in Wilderness Case Law
Forest Service Regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 36 
Forest Service website: www.fs.gov 
BLM Regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 43
Bureau of Land Management website: www.blm.gov 
Park Service Regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 36 
Park Service website: www.nps.gov 
Fish and Wildlife Service Regulations, Code of Federal Regulations, Title 1 
Fish and Wildlife Service website: www.fws.gov
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Appendix A Continued
Constitutional Amendm ents in  W ilderness Case Law 
Property Clause, United States Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl. 2 
United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment
Appendix A




source: Black's Law Dictionary
ARBITRARY. Means in an "arbitrary' manner, as fixed or done capriciously 
or at pleasure; without adequate determining principle; not founded in the 
nature of things; nonjrational; not done or acting according to reason or 
judgment; depending on the will alone; absolutely in power; capriciously; 
tyrannical; despotic; Comeil v. Swisher County, Tex.Civ.App., 78 S.W.2d 
1072,1074. Without fair, solid, and substantial cause; that is, without cause 
based upon the law. U.S. v. Lotempio, D.C.N.Y., 58 F.2d 358,359; not 
governed by any fixed rules or standard. People ex. rel. Hutlman v. Gilchrist, 
188 N.Y.S. 61,65,114 Misc. 651.
ARGUENDO. In arguing; in the course of the argument. A statement or 
observation made by a judge as a matter of argument or illustration, but not 
directly bearing upon the case at bar, or only incidentally involved in it, is 
said (in the reports) to be made arguendo, or in the abbreviated form, arg.
ARGUMENT. An effort to establish belief by a course of reasoning.
In rhetoric and logic, an inference draw n from premises, the truth of 
which is indisputable, or at least highly probable.
BAD FAITH. The opposite of "good faith," generally implying or involving 
actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a 
neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not 
prom pted by an innocent mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some 
interested or sinister motive. State v. Griffin, 100 B.C. 331,84 S.E. 876,877; 
Penn Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., C.C.A. Term., 
73 F. 653,19 C.C.A. 316,38 L.R.A. 33  ̂70; Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 297 
Mass. 398,8 N.E.2d 895,907.
COLLATERAL. By the side; at the side; attached upon the side. Not lineal, 
but upon a parallel or diverging line. Additional or auxiliary; 
supplementary; co-operating; accompanying as a secondary fact; or acting as 
a secondary agent; related to, complementary; accompanying as a co­
ordinate, City Investment & Loan Co. v. Wichita Hardware Co.,
Tex.Civ.App., 57 S.W.2d 222, 223; collateral security. Pepper v. Beville, 100 
Fla. 97,129 So. 334,337.
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL. The collateral determination of a question by a 
court having general jurisdiction of the subject. Small v. Haskins, 26 Vt. 209.
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GOOD FAITH. Honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of 
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. Siano v. 
Helvering, D.C.N.J., 13 F.Supp. 776,780. An honest intention to abstain from 
taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities 
of law, together w ith absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of 
facts which render transactions unconscientious. Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. 
Allen, 248 Ky. 646,59 S.W.2d 534,91 A.L.R. 890; Crouch v. First Nat. Bank,
156 m. 342,40 N.E. 974; Waugh v. Prince, 121 Me. 67,115 A. 612,614.
JUDGMENT. An opinion or estimate. McClung Const. Co. v. Muncy, 
Tex.Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 786,790.
The formation of an opinion or notion concerning some thing by 
exercising the mind upon it. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. Humphreys, 
C.C.A. Ohio, 97 F.2d 849,857.
The official and authentic decision of a court of justice upon the 
respective rights and claims of parties to an action or suit therein litigated and 
submitted to its determination. People v. Hebei, 19 Colo.App. 523,76 P. 550; 
Bullock V .  Bullock, 52 N.J.Eq. 561,30 A. 676,27 L.R.A. 213,46 Am.St.Rep. 528; 
State V .  Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 18 R.1.16,25 A. 246,17 L.R.A. 856.
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